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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major Amer-
ican cities started aggressively deploying pedestrian stops and 
body searches in response to escalating violent crime rates.1 
The programmatic deployment of “stop and frisk” or “stop, 
question, and frisk” (SQF) in New York,2 Chicago,3 Philadelph-
ia,4 and other major cities5 involved large numbers of street 
stops and frisks, often concentrated in a handful of minority 
neighborhoods. Given the volume of individuals stopped, SQF 
likely became the modal form of police-citizen contact for many 
urban residents.6 Between May and August 2014, for example, 
police in Chicago stopped more than 250,000 people—which 
translates into 93.6 stops per 1000 inhabitants.7 In Philadelph-
ia, police have stopped between 215,000 and 253,000 people per 
year since 2009.8 In Baltimore, the Department of Justice esti-
 
 1. Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 337, 339 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 337; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 
589–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing early history of SQF in New York City). 
 3. Elliott Ramos, Poor Data Keeps Chicago’s Stop and Frisk Hidden from 
Scrutiny, WBEZ 91.5 CHIC. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/poor 
-data-keeps-chicagos-stop-and-frisk-hidden-scrutiny-108670 (describing use of 
stop and frisk in Chicago, but noting absence of sound record-keeping). 
 4. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, with 
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A11. 
 5. Laird Harrison, Oakland Police Consultant Defends ‘Stop, Ask and 
Frisk,’ KQED NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/02/25/ 
oakland-police-consultant-defends-stop-ask-and-frisk (discussing SQF policies 
in Los Angeles and Oakland). 
 6. In Chicago, for example, “being stopped for investigative purposes is 
the predominant experience residents have with the police.” Wesley G. 
Skogan, Stop-and-Frisk and Trust in Police in Chicago (Inst. for Pol’y Res., 
Working Paper No. WP-16-08 (2016)), http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/ 
publications/papers/2016/WP-16-08.html (emphasis omitted).  
 7. ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 11 (2015), http://www.aclu 
-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf. Because many 
individuals were stopped more than once, the effect of the policy was even 
more concentrated. See generally id. at 3 (describing how the stops were dis-
proportionately concentrated). 
 8. David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 369, 378 (2014). 
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mates, roughly 412,000 people were stopped in 2014.9 At its 
peak in 2011, New York’s SQF policy generated more than 
685,700 stops per year.10 Between 2004 and 2013, that city’s in-
habitants experienced roughly five million street stops.11 
Given the sheer scale of these intrusions into citizens’ daily 
lives, it is hardly surprising that SQF would provoke some pub-
lic controversy. Sharp-elbowed debate has ensued as to whether 
African Americans and Hispanics are being inappropriately 
stopped and searched.12 In addition to catalyzing a wider na-
tional argument about race and policing,13 SQF has sparked 
large-scale public protests,14 mayoral campaigns,15 threats to 
sue,16 and litigation itself. In the wake of legal challenges, set-
tlements or consent decrees regulating the use of street stops 
have been reached in the past few years in several cities. In the 
last year or so, New York,17 Chicago,18 Philadelphia,19 Cincin-
 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 25 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
file/883366/download. 
 10. CHRISTOPHER DUNN, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 
2012, at 3 (Jennifer Carnig ed., 2013), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf. 
 11. Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of 
Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015). 
 12. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Re-
visited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Chang-
ing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 
309, 312–14 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) (documenting 
disparities in stops in the New York context); STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, 
supra note 7, at 3 (finding the same results in Chicago). 
 13. For a snapshot of that debate, see Julie Bloom et al., Attack on Offic-
ers Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2016, at A1. 
 14. See, e.g., John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently 
To Protest Stop-and-Frisk Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at A15 (describ-
ing a protest in response to SQF). 
 15. See Khorri Atkinson, Mayor de Blasio To Reform Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. 
AMSTERDAM NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/feb/ 
06/mayor-de-blasio-reform-stop-and-frisk (describing a mayoral campaign fo-
cused on reforming SQF). 
 16. Aamer Madhani, Chicago Police and ACLU Agree to Stop-and-Frisk 
Safeguards, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/31277041. 
 17. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (appointing a monitor and ordering broad systemic equitable relief ). 
 18. Settlement Agreement, City of Chicago, Chi. Police Dep’t & Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Ill., Investigatory Stop and Protective Pat Down (2015), 
http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory 
-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme.pdf [hereinafter Chicago 
Settlement]. 
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nati,20 New Orleans,21 Seattle,22 Baltimore,23 Cleveland,24 and 
Newark25 have all entered into either a judicial decree or a sim-
ilar form of settlement process. Two cities, Boston and Oak-
land, did not wait for litigation, but engaged expert consult-
ants; in both cases, the consultant isolated evidence of racial 
discrimination in street policing.26 
The debate over SQF is heated in part because of disa-
greement about how the core moral wrong of intensive street 
policing (if one exists) should be conceived. The law provides a 
starting point for this inquiry, but ultimately not a satisfying 
answer. 
The legal framework employed by many of the aforemen-
tioned settlements and consent decrees is modeled on a body of 
black-letter constitutional doctrine that is focused centrally on 
the motivations and beliefs of specific, individual officers. For 
 
 19. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, & Consent Decree at 4–5, 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2010) (C.A. No. 10-5952), http://www 
.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198 [hereinafter Philadelphia Set-
tlement]. 
 20. Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(No. C-1-99-317) (on file with author); see also In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 
F.R.D. 395, 400–04 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (affirming settlement). 
 21. United States v. City of New Orleans, 947 F. Supp. 2d 601, 631 (E.D. 
La. 2012), aff ’d, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming consent decree); Con-
sent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, United States v. 
City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924 (E.D. La. 2012) [hereinafter New Orleans 
Decree] (on file with author). 
 22. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, 
United States v. City of Seattle, (W.D. Wash. 2012) (No. 12-CV-1282) [herein-
after Seattle Settlement] (on file with author); see also Mahoney v. Holder, 62 
F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (describing settlement process). 
 23. UNITED STATES & CITY OF BALT., AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE CITY OF BALTIMORE REGARDING THE BALTIMORE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883376/ 
download [hereinafter BALTIMORE AGREEMENT]. 
 24. Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Phil-
adelphia, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/ 
stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html. 
 25. Id. 
 26. STANFORD UNIV., SPARQ: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWERS TO REAL-
WORLD QUESTIONS, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN 
OAKLAND, CALIF. 5–6 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt ed., 2016), https://stanford.app 
.box.com/v/Strategies-for-Change [hereinafter OAKLAND REPORT]; Boston Po-
lice Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study 
Results, BPDNEWS.COM (Oct. 8, 2014), http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/ 
boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio 
-study-results (reporting some racial disparities in both stops and frisks). 
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example, in New York, the case of Floyd v. City of New York, 
which has yielded the only extensive judicial decision on SQF, 
focused first on the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision Terry v. 
Ohio,27 which held that officers need “reasonable, articulable 
suspicion” of criminality to make a nonconsensual street-stop 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.28 Then, citing the Su-
preme Court’s 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney,29 the Floyd court held that plaintiffs had to show that 
SQF not only had a racially disparate effect, but had been 
adopted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon” certain racial groups.30 
Other consent decrees and settlements are also crafted in 
the shadow of Terry and Feeney. The Seattle settlement is typi-
cal in commanding that the police department adopt a street-
stop policy that “explicitly conform[s] to constitutional re-
quirements,” that officers be annually trained on “Fourth 
Amendment and related law,” and that patrolling police act 
“free of unlawful bias.”31 Similarly, the Philadelphia settlement 
condemns “stops, frisks, or searches . . . made without the req-
uisite reasonable suspicion” and envisages “policies and prac-
tices to ensure that stops and frisks are not conducted on the 
basis of the race or ethnic origin of the suspect, except where 
the law permits race or ethnic origin to be considered . . . .”32  
This individualist black-letter doctrine means that even 
absent litigation to a final judgment, courts and legal reform 
efforts have to use a relatively narrow lens trained solely upon 
discrete, interpersonal transactions. Similarly, the dominant 
economic model of racial bias in policing focuses on the identifi-
cation of individual officers’ taste-based discrimination over 
and above statistical discrimination.33 
 
 27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 28. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Separately, the Fourth Amendment requires 
that an officer “reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dan-
gerous” before conducting a protective pat-down, or frisk. Id. at 568 (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 321 F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 29. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 30. Id. at 662 (quoting Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 (2d Cir. 
2010)). 
 31. Seattle Settlement, supra note 22, ¶¶ 140, 142, 145. 
 32. Philadelphia Settlement, supra note 19, at 1, 4. 
 33. John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory 
and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001). 
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This Article argues that SQF presents a normative chal-
lenge that is not well captured by the individualistic lens of 
Terry and Feeney, or by a focus on taste-based discrimination as 
a more general matter. The distinctive moral harm of SQF does 
not turn on racial animus per Feeney, or weak evidentiary pred-
icates per Terry although both might well exist and even be 
pervasive on the ground. This harm, indeed, does not arise 
within the narrow, individualist “transactional frame” that cur-
rently dominates both law and economics.34 
SQF today is defined by its large scale and “group-based” 
application.35 Its distinctive moral wrong is inextricably related 
to this programmatic quality, not the happenstance of individ-
ual officers’ motives.36 The core of this wrong is structural. Ac-
cordingly, the welfarist analysis I propose in Part I is focused 
on the large-scale, programmatic use of SQF as observed in 
New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. In contrast, I have no 
cavil with the retail use of Terry stops as an element of 
nonprogrammatic street policing. When operationalized at a 
large scale, however, SQF is an important link in the reproduc-
tion of social and racial stratification. In this regard, it typically 
has large regressive distributional effects and surprisingly lit-
tle value-added as a crime control measure.  
More specifically, SQF should be understood as a histori-
cally situated innovation that responds to late twentieth-
century urban pathologies in a manner that predictably per-
petuates those criminogenic pathologies. The call for SQF arose 
in important measure because local and state governments had 
 
 34. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 
YALE L.J. 1311, 1313–14 (2002) (“Constitutional cases, like common-law ones, 
are typically conceptualized as discrete transactions in which government in-
flicts harm on some individual by making her worse off relative to some base-
line position or, under equality rules, relative to some reference individual or 
group.”). 
 35. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the 
Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821 (2011) (offering this descrip-
tion of New York City’s policy). The dominant “individualism” of Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence has long been subject to decisive and devastating critique. 
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 127 (1976). 
 36. I use the term “moral wrong” to signal that my argument is not cen-
trally normative, and not legal in nature. My analysis, presented in Part II, is 
consequentialist in nature. It is my view that the range of relevant conse-
quences for an evaluation of public policy is capacious, and not limited to nar-
rowly drawn monetizable harms. Recognizing the normative nature of any ef-
fort to identify salient costs and benefits, I flag in my analysis those costs or 
benefits that rest on a potentially contestable moral judgment. 
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engaged in policies that over time fostered minority neighbor-
hoods that remain entrenched in concentrated poverty and suf-
fer from high violent-crime rates. Rather than addressing those 
underlying conditions, local and state policy-makers have cho-
sen to respond with a policy that has stigmatizes minority resi-
dents, that has limited crime-control benefits, and that imposes 
large negative spillovers on disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
Viewed in this dynamic perspective, SQF catalyzes an en-
tangled set of individual and neighborhood-level harms. 
Through mutually reinforcing interactions, these various 
harms reinforce the social and racial stratification that initially 
set the stage for massive street policing expenditures. Without 
a clear grasp of this ecological and dynamic context, current 
remedial interventions are likely to fall short or to go astray. 
In response to such ecological and dynamic dimensions, 
constitutional law is now disarmed. Some other tool is needed. 
Consistent with a growing body of scholarship that resists the 
narrow transactional frame of current constitutional doctrine37 
and the dominant doctrinal focus on individual officials’ fault,38 
I argue that our current doctrinal models for capturing the 
harms of aggressive policing fall woefully short. Instead, a more 
structural and capacious legal framework is needed to encapsu-
late the core moral objections to SQF. 
An alternative, more promising legal framework is a ver-
sion of the disparate-impact standard familiar from the em-
ployment discrimination39 and fair housing contexts.40 A dispar-
 
 37. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional 
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051, 2057 (2016) 
(criticizing “criminal courts’ transactional myopia” and their lack of “a holistic 
picture of how the criminal justice system operates”). 
 38. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitu-
tional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (“[T]he Court has developed a gate-
keeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies . . . .”); Jennifer 
E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Conver-
gence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) (same); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Gen-
evieve Lakier, The Triumph of Fault in Public Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940016 
(mapping out the role of fault concepts in both substantive criminal law and 
the law of constitutional remedies). 
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[A] complaining party 
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that 
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is 
job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty.”); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (allowing 
disparate impact under the 1964 version of Title VII). A disparate-impact the-
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ate-impact framework is better able to account for the eviden-
tiary problems involved in accounting for the diverse forms of 
discrimination manifested in a complex system characterized 
by a high degree of diffused discretion.41  
To be clear, this alternative approach is by no means per-
fect. It does not provide a proxy for the thorough evaluation of 
both costs and benefits presented in this Article. Rather, dis-
parate impact isolates a subset of problematic cases in which 
SQF’s heavy burden is asymmetrically assigned to minority 
communities. It demands a robust justification from the state 
for that potentially regressive, subordinating, and demoralizing 
situation. In this regard, it is better placed than either Fourth 
Amendment or Equal Protection doctrine to resist the exacer-
bation of racial hierarchies.42  
No theory of liability, however, will be a comprehensive 
panacea to a complex and entrenched social phenomenon like 
concentrated, racialized, poverty. Disparate-impact liability for 
SQF captures the instances in which the moral wrong of SQF is 
at its acme (even if it does not capture all instances in which 
that wrong arises). It helps ensure that policing responses 
make matters no worse. It is emphatically only a piece of the 
larger mosaic of needful policing reform that ought to be pur-
sued through both judicial and political avenues. 
Disparate-impact liability is often overlooked because it 
has not been part of Equal Protection doctrine since the early 
1970s.43 Because of the Constitution-centered focus of much 
scholarship, it is easy to forget it is available. But a disparate-
impact standard is available under both federal statutes that 
 
ory of liability is also available under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
 40. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513, 2515, 2526 (2015) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 
3605(a) (1988) to permit disparate-impact liability). 
 41. See generally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Im-
pact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 520–23 (2003) (discussing the evi-
dentiary use of disparate-impact liability). 
 42. See id. at 523–24 (arguing that disparate impact is a “mechanism[] for 
ending segregation and racial hierarchy”). 
 43. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not 
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to 
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). Prior to Davis, disparate 
impact was an important element of the constitutional doctrine in this do-
main. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13–16 
(2013) (collecting cases). 
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regulate local police departments44 and also (in California45 and 
Illinois46) state law.47 The Chicago settlement and the New Or-
leans settlement invoke some of these disparate-impact rules 
as guiding authorizations.48 Nevertheless, neither elaborates 
upon their bare-bone textual references. As a result, the analyt-
ic and practical advantages of a disparate-impact lens for police 
remain underappreciated. The theoretical questions raised by 
its translation to the policing context also remain poorly under-
stood. 
My final aim is to show how disparate impact can serve as 
a lens for analyzing street policing in practice. To that end, I 
consider how disparate racial impacts might be sifted from the 
granular policing data increasingly being collected by large po-
lice departments as a result of settlements and consent de-
crees.49  
Specifically, I sketch three tractable empirical strategies 
for identifying disparate impact in street stop-related policies. 
First, deployment-related disparities between beats or districts 
within a jurisdiction can be measured to ascertain whether a 
municipality’s overall distribution of policing resources can be 
justified on race-neutral grounds.50 Second, within a given beat 
 
 44. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regula-
tions apply to police departments that receive federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2016) (implementing regu-
lations). The Safe Streets Act also prohibits local police action with a racially 
disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1) (2012) (“No person in any State shall 
on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity 
funded in whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.”); see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 42.201 (2016) (implementing regulations). 
 45. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 11135 (2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 
§ 11154 (c), (i) (2017). 
 46. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/5(a)(1) (2003). 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. Chicago Settlement, supra note 18, at 6; New Orleans Decree, supra 
note 21, at 1–2. 
 49. See generally David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop 
and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
853, 871–72 (2013) (describing how some consent decrees and settlements re-
quire data collection). 
 50. Larger policy has a role in shaping street-level outcomes. See Shannon 
Portillo & Danielle S. Rudes, Construction of Justice at the Street Level, 10 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 321, 331 (2014) (“When police routinize stop and 
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or district, disparities in how stops are allocated among differ-
ent ethnic and racial groups can be evaluated.51 Finally, at the 
level of given officers, disparities in the quantum of suspicion 
deployed for whites and nonwhites can be assessed by using a 
range of empirical tools.52  
By aggregating and contrasting disparities at these differ-
ent levels, the empirical approach that I sketch roughly enables 
a better understanding of the causes and extent of SQF’s dis-
parate impact. That understanding in turn can serve as a foun-
dation for more targeted, less disruptive, and more effective 
remedial interventions. 
These empirical approaches, moreover, enable disparate 
impact’s translation to the policing context while avoiding the 
constitutional and practical problems encountered in the em-
ployment discrimination context. For each empirical approach 
posited, I consider the range of legitimate exculpatory justifica-
tions that might be offered to diffuse a prima facie finding of 
racial disparity.53 I further respond to weaknesses made appar-
ent by disparate impact’s extant operation in other contexts. In 
the employment discrimination context, for example, there has 
been disagreement about how to identify business justifications 
that can justify racial disparities,54 and the magnitude of ulti-
mate disparities required for liability.55 
 
frisk policies, and . . . ration services, attempt to control uncertainty, husband 
worker resources, and manage consequences of routines, they do so within the 
confines of existing policy.”). 
 51. Precinct or beat-level effects can be captured through multilevel mod-
eling techniques in which data on stops is structured so that individual racial 
groups are nested within precincts. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D at 40, 
Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (08 Civ. 01034 
(SAS)), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_ 
JeffreyFagan.pdf [hereinafter Fagan Report] (describing modeling technique); 
Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 813, 817–18 (2007) (same). 
 52. See Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial 
Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED 
STAT. 365, 371 (2016) [hereinafter Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?] (describ-
ing tools); see also Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the 
Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 186 (2017) [hereinafter Goel et al., 
Combatting Police Discrimination]. 
 53. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 375 (discussing potential justifications). 
 54. The availability of employer justifications has been the subject of dis-
pute both on the Supreme Court and in Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[An employer must] demonstrate that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business  
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The use of disparate impact in the employment context has 
also generated worries about the doctrine’s constitutionality56 
and its efficacy in promoting structural policy change.57 In 
translating disparate impact to the policing context, I consider 
and reject each of these reasons as a reason for abandoning the 
translation. 
The possibility of disparate impact as a template for re-
thinking urban policing has yet to be explored in any detail, 
although an earlier article by David Sklansky and colleagues 
touches on the question.58 But my analysis aligns with pene-
trating work by Tracey Meares, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda 
Geller, all of whom correctly emphasize that SQF is a distinc-
tive mode of urban policing that cannot be analyzed in terms of 
discrete interactions because “programmatic stops are imposed 
from the top down” at a massive scale.59 Furthermore, I echo 
Richard Banks’ worry about the “potential inadequacy as a pol-
icy framework” of much constitutional doctrine, although my 
 
necessity.”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Re-
sponse to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 287–89 
(2011) (describing disagreements between legislators and President George 
H.W. Bush on this topic). Compare Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (describing a relatively lenient standard for business jus-
tifications), with id. at 671–72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating for a more 
demanding standard). 
 55. See Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 573–74 (1991) (noting the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission indicates the threshold should be “four-fifths . . . of the 
rate for the group with the highest rate,” but also stating alternative views). 
 56. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged 
sooner or later, and it behooves us now to begin thinking about how—and on 
what terms—to make peace between them.”). 
 57. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 701, 706 (2006) (“[D]isparate impact theory has produced less change 
than typically assumed . . . .”); see also George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Dif-
ferent Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS (1992) and arguing that Epstein overstates the impact of disparate-
impact theory). 
 58. See Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at 
28–30. 
 59. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitu-
tionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
159, 162–63 (2015); accord Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 61 (“Stop-and-
frisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was largely a set of distinct ‘retail’ 
transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia, 
and specificity. But the current ‘wholesale’ practice is quite different from the 
vision of the Terry Court.”). 
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diagnosis and response to the problem of race in policing differ 
from his approach.60  
In addition, my analysis diverges sharply from the large 
literature on “racial profiling,”61 which more narrowly focuses 
on intentional animus or the purposive use of race as a criteri-
on in enforcement decisions.62 Unlike these analyses, my ap-
proach does not focus on individual fault or bad intent. Instead, 
I argue that legal intervention should be organized around the 
interaction between a specific kind of common policing strategy 
and larger social dynamics of racial segmentation and stratifi-
cation.63 
The argument proceeds in three steps. In Part I, I provide 
a comprehensive, empirically robust account of SQF as a dis-
tinctive modality of urban policing, highlighting the dynamic 
negative effects of SQF upon minority communities in concen-
trated urban poverty. Part II turns to the constitutional doc-
trine developed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause to regulate such policing. Using Terry 
 
 60. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug 
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574 (2003). 
 61. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitution-
al: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 n.2 (2015) (collecting the large legal scholarly 
literature on racial profiling). 
 62. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Color-
blind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1080 
(2001) (“Suspect description reliance, like racial profiling, is both useful and 
racially discriminatory.”); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road 
Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 651, 654–55 (2002) (“As we use the term, ‘racial profiling’ occurs when a 
law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise inves-
tigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s ra-
cial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the 
sort of crime the officer is investigating.”); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Living-
ston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) 
(same). Outside the legal academy, racial profiling is also defined in crimino-
logical, economic, and normative terms. Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the ‘Out-
come Test’ in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1, 6 (2008) (summarizing 
different approaches). My analysis of SQF overlaps with Engel’s “economic” 
and “normative” models. Id. 
 63. For an example of this broader lens, see MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY 
FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLIC-
ING TACTIC 81–102 (2016) (discussing “collateral consequences” of SQF). The 
“disparate impact” analysis defines its central analytic focus in terms of “pur-
poseful” discrimination rather than differential effects. J. Mitchell Pickerill et 
al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Im-
pact Framework, 31 LAW & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009). This is not how the term is used 
in the legal scholarship, and I do not follow that definition. 
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and Feeney as focal points, I demonstrate that constitutional 
doctrine systematically fails to account for the harms that flow 
from SQF. The gap reveals inconsistencies and internal contra-
dictions within the doctrine. Having rejected the default 
framework for legal analysis of SQF, I sketch in Part III an al-
ternative lens of disparate impact. Concluding, I illustrate 
three empirical strategies that might be used to determine 
whether remedial intervention is warranted. In so doing, I hope 
to show that disparate impact is a practicable and plausible 
approach for use by courts and other supervisory and regulato-
ry bodies. 
I.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STOP AND FRISK 
POLICING   
To evaluate stop and frisk as a way of eliciting public order 
requires an understanding of its costs and benefits in historical 
and social context. This Part therefore begins by offering a def-
inition of SQF as a historically situated strategy employed by 
urban police forces. It then develops a careful tally of its pros 
and cons.  
Some courts have analyzed SQF in terms of costs while 
bracketing its benefits.64 I disagree with this approach. Appre-
ciation of the distinctive wrong of SQF demands a comprehen-
sive understanding of related justifications, criticisms, and 
benefits, all nested in an ecological and dynamic context. 
A. DEFINING STOP AND FRISK (SQF) 
Stop, question, and frisk, or SQF, is an urban policing 
measure that involves the large-scale deployment of officers in 
public spaces (e.g., sidewalks, alleys, the communal outdoor 
spaces of public housing) tasked with conducting frequent in-
vestigative stops. Under a line of cases beginning with Terry v. 
Ohio,65 an officer is entitled to make a “brief” nonconsensual 
“investigatory stop” if she has “a reasonable articulable suspi-
 
 64. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“This Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police 
behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.”). 
 65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court did not provide the canonical for-
mulation of the Fourth Amendment standard but instead more ambiguously 
asked whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ’ that the ac-
tion taken was appropriate?” Id. at 21–22. 
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cion” that a crime either has occurred or is about to occur.66 
Separately, if the officer has a further reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the person stopped is “‘armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others,’ he may conduct a ‘limited 
protective search’ for concealed weapons.”67  
In either the stop or the frisk context, reasonable articula-
ble suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable 
cause. But it still requires “a minimal level of objective justifi-
cation.”68  
In addition to a stop and a frisk, officers may take further 
actions ranging from a verbal caution or a citation to an arrest. 
Arrests vary widely in character. They can be discretionary or 
mandatory.69 They may be based on conduct or evidence discov-
ered by the officer during the stop, or they might be predicated 
on an outstanding warrant revealed when a person’s name is 
cross-referenced with state, local, or federal databases. 
The jurisprudence of Terry stops and frisks focuses on dis-
crete transactions between specific officers and specific defend-
ants. But this is misleading.70 SQF (as I have defined it) is a 
policy that operates today at scale. Not tens or hundreds of in-
dividuals but tens or hundreds of thousands are arrested over 
the course of months. In New York, for example, there were 
313,047 documented stops in 2004 and 576,394 stops in 2009.71 
In Philadelphia, a city with one-fifth New York’s population, 
there were more than 200,000 stops each of the last three years 
 
 66. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The earliest use of the 
phrase “reasonable, articulable suspicion” was twelve years after Terry in 
Brown v. Texas, as an unattributed quotation from the state’s brief. 443 U.S. 
47, 51 (1979). The phrase was used to create common law first in the case 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). 
 67. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 24). 
 68. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 7 (1989). 
 69. The standard view in criminology is that arrests are a highly discre-
tionary decision because they are dispersed, somewhat aleatory in timing, and 
hence hard to supervise. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 
408 (2005); see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 
817 (2015). Even where law imposes a duty on officers to make an arrest (for 
example, in domestic violence cases), officers as a practical matter maintain a 
measure of discretion as to what to do. 
 70. See Meares, supra note 59, at 175. 
 71. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 18, 19 tbl.1; see also supra text ac-
companying notes 7–11 (citing stop rates in New York and Chicago). 
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despite the existence of a court-supervised consent decree.72 The 
analysis in this Section is focused on SQF as deployed en 
masse. 
SQF has similarities to, and can overlap somewhat with, 
the strategy of “broken windows” or “quality of life” policing.73 
But the tactics are distinct. Whereas broken windows policing 
relies on arrests “to remove undesirable persons from a neigh-
borhood,”74 SQF can involve a relatively low rate of arrests.75 
SQF tends to be a direct response to violent crime. It is not a 
prophylactic response to the possibility that the sight of “bro-
ken windows” will induce escalating forms of disorder.76 Hence, 
criticisms of “broken windows” policing cannot be translated to 
SQF in any mechanical fashion.  
One more detail is essential to my functional definition of 
SQF: within a city, SQF is typically employed with greatest in-
tensity on a small subset of neighborhoods.77 Typically, its de-
ployment is highest in neighborhoods characterized by “concen-
trated poverty” where crime rates tend to be higher than in 
other parts of the city.78 In Chicago, for example, one study of 
 
 72. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Prac-
tices at 20, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/2230/198. 
 73. Amanda Geller, The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Ar-
rests in the Broken Windows Era, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1025, 1029–31 (2016) 
(distinguishing the two approaches); see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Rela-
tionship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City 
“Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504–07 (2014) (same). 
 74. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic 
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465. 
 75. Geller, supra note 73, at 1032 (noting, based on New York data, that 
“relatively few street stops lead to arrest”). That said, broken windows policing 
and a concomitant rise in the rate of arrests tend to be geographically collocat-
ed with SQF. 
 76. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 74. A decisive critique is offered in 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 166–80 (2001). 
 77. David Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contribut-
ed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police 
Strength? The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strate-
gy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 141, 142 tbl.1 (2014) (finding that five percent of intersec-
tions in New York produced about fifty percent of SQFs in 2009 and fifty-six 
percent in 2010). 
 78. For empirical evidence, see Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, 
Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime: Recent Les-
sons and New Directions for Research, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 347–52 (2005); 
Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS AM. 
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stops in 2014 found 266 stops per 1000 residents in the African-
American neighborhood of Englewood, but 43 stops per 1000 
residents in the white neighborhood of Lincoln/Foster.79  
In particular, SQF tends to be concentrated upon minori-
ty—i.e., African-American and Hispanic—neighborhoods. In 
New York, the district court in Floyd found that the racial 
composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor of the 
density of stops than its lagged crime rate.80 And at the height 
of New York’s SQF, an African-American resident of New York 
City had a ninety-two percent chance of being stopped in a sin-
gle year period.81  
SQF, in short, is not just a high-frequency policing strate-
gy, it is also a highly geographically concentrated one in minor-
ity (African-American and Hispanic) neighborhoods. So even if 
it entails a low rate of arrest, therefore, it is likely that SQF at 
least contributes to the exceedingly high rates of minority ar-
rests in the jurisdictions in which it is deployed.82 
In summary, SQF is best understood as the large-scale use 
of Terry stops in predominantly black and Hispanic urban 
neighborhoods in response to violent crime. Its architects are 
cognizant of, and indeed embrace, this racial asymmetry.83 But 
 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 124–25 (2000). 
 79. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 9. 
 80. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
see also Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 3–4 (explaining neighborhood differ-
ences). 
 81. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41 (2014). 
 82. About forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino 
men will be arrested by age twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic 
Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014). 
 83. See, e.g., Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Commissioner Kelly Says Almost 
75% of Violent Crime Committed by African-Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(May 2, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/commissioner-kelly 
-defends-stop-and-frisk-targeting-african-americans-article-1.1332840# 
ixzz2UiHaXcKt; Ray Kelly, Ray Kelly: The NYPD: Guilty of Saving 7,383 
Lives, WALL  ST. J. (July 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412 
7887324448104578616333588719320; Azi Paybarah, Ray Kelly: By the De-
partment’s Count, African-Americans Are Being Understopped, POLITICO (May 
2, 2013), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2013/05/ray 
-kelly-by-the-departments-count-african-americans-are-being-understopped 
-000000; see also Heather Mac Donald, How To Increase the Crime Rate Na-
tionwide, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324063304578525850909628878 (defending racially dis-
parate street policing on the ground that “the preponderance of crime perpe-
trators, and victims, in New York are also minorities”). 
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rather than dwelling on whether their views should be ranked 
as invidious discrimination, I engage in a more consequentialist 
inquiry: I consider the gains and the harms from SQF. These, I 
contend, must be understood in light of geographic and histori-
cal context to be appreciated properly. It is the benefits of SQF 
that I focus upon first before considering costs. 
B. THE CRIME-CONTROL BENEFITS OF SQF IN CONTEXT 
1. The Case for SQF 
Aggressive use of street stops at a high volume has a long 
historical pedigree.84 By 1969, they had become so endemic that 
the Kerner Commission, established by President Johnson to 
investigate the 1967 urban riots, singled out the police’s exces-
sive use of investigative stops85 and the “wholesale harassment 
by certain elements of the police community, of which minority 
groups, particularly Negros, frequently complain.”86 Today’s 
fires are residues of yesterday’s conflagrations. 
SQF in its modern form is a direct response to an uptick of 
violent crime in the 1980s collocated with what William Julius 
Wilson called the persistence of “ghetto poverty.”87 The political 
sponsors of the policy consistently identified violent crime con-
 
 84. The earliest programmatic use of SQF I have been able to identify oc-
curred in Cincinnati’s Avondale neighborhood in 1958. Alex Elkins, The Ori-
gins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN (May 9, 2015), http://www.jacobinmag.com/ 
2015/05/stop-and-frisk-dragnet-ferguson-baltimore. SQF was subsequently 
used in cities such as San Francisco in the 1960s. CHRISTOPHER LOWEN AGEE, 
THE STREETS OF SAN FRANCISCO: POLICING AND THE CREATION OF A COSMO-
POLITAN LIBERAL POLITICS, 1950–72, at 35–39 (2014). During most of the 
twentieth century, however, the use of street patrols was in the decline. Eric 
H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992). 
Up to the 1960s, policing was “primarily reactive,” an orientation modified by 
the rise of community policing. James J. Willis, A Recent History of the Police, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 3, 6–7 (Michael D. Reisig 
& Robert J. Kane eds., 2014). A 1966 study of Chicago police, for example, 
found they spent one percent of their time proactively stopping people, four-
teen percent of their time reacting to the public’s calls, and eighty-five percent 
of their time on unstructured random patrols. Lawrence W. Sherman, The 
Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIM & 
JUST. 377, 378 (2013). 
 85. NAT’L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 158–61 (1968). 
 86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). 
 87. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF 
THE NEW URBAN POOR 12 (1996). 
  
2414 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2397 
 
trol as its core aim.88 Because violent crime is disproportionate-
ly committed by African Americans and concentrated in black 
neighborhoods, they argued, it is no surprise that SQF focuses 
on those predominantly minority neighborhoods.89 Rather than 
proof of anti-minority animus, the use of SQF is evidence for 
this view that police are exerting special efforts to protect mi-
norities from crime. The persuasive force of this argument from 
crime control is the subject of this subpart while the tally of 
SQF’s costs is addressed in the following subpart. 
The genesis of an argument for SQF’s crime-control bene-
fits is found in the early 1990s. In 1994, the sociologist James 
Q. Wilson published an influential opinion piece in the New 
York Times entitled “Just Take Away Their Guns,” a phrase 
that succinctly encapsulated the distinctive appeal of SQF.90 
Wilson argued for the aggressive use of Terry stops as a means 
to “reduce the number of people who carry guns unlawfully, es-
pecially in places—on streets, in taverns—where the mere 
presence of a gun can increase the hazards we all face.”91 His 
call responded directly to what by any measure was a grave cri-
sis of law and order. At the time, New York City was suffering 
from a high homicide rate.92 Of the 1951 murders that occurred 
in New York in 1993, the year ending as Wilson wrote, more 
than 1500 were committed by firearm.93 
Wilson’s call for aggressive street policing as a prophylaxis 
for gun violence found a measure of empirical support the fol-
lowing year. In 1995, the criminologist Lawrence Sherman and 
colleagues published the results of a quasi-experiment conduct-
ed for twenty-nine weeks in Kansas City of gun-based, inten-
sive street policing and found a forty-nine percent decline in 
gun crimes without any spillover to neighboring areas.94 
 
 88. See Leo Eisenstein & Laura Gottesdiener, Why Michael Bloomberg Is 
Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk, ROLLING STONE (May 22, 2013), http://www 
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-michael-bloomberg-is-wrong-about-stop 
-and-frisk-20130522 (“Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner 
Ray Kelly have dismissed these concerns, claiming that stop-and-frisk has 
dramatically reduced the city’s murder rate.”). 
 89. See sources cited supra note 80. 
 90. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine/just-take-away-their 
-guns.html?pagewanted=all. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder, 39 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534 (1999). 
 93. Id. at 534 fig.1, 535 fig.2. 
 94. Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on 
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Results of this kind prompted “[s]cores of cities [to] rush[] 
to follow the Kansas City model”95 by seizing upon SQF as a 
tool for lowering violent crime rates. The earliest adopter of 
SQF, New York City, seems to have begun aggressive use of 
Terry stops (as distinct from “broken windows” policing) around 
1994. A parallel aggressive use of stops in Philadelphia came to 
public attention in 2000 after a scandal involving hundreds of 
unlawful arrests, searches, and prosecutions in the 39th Police 
District led to the disclosure of incident reports showing a high 
rate of illegal stops.96  
In the early 1990s, constitutional litigation over Chicago’s 
“gang loitering” ordinance in part hinged on the 42,000 stops 
executed under that measure over three years.97 The Chicago 
Police Department’s limited collection of information about its 
stops and frisks meant that it was not until 2015 that data 
emerged showing that the city’s SQF intensity had exceeded its 
usage patterns of the 1990s (and, incidentally, also overshot 
New York City’s per capita stop rates).98 
Crucially, the policing strategy endorsed by Wilson, and 
implicitly supported by the Kansas City evidence, does not lend 
itself to uniform application across entire cities. Violent crime 
in urban contexts has long been closely correlated with a subset 
of geographic areas typically characterized by concentrated 
poverty.99 In turn, concentrated urban poverty, both in the 
1990s and today, is not evenly spread across racial ethnic 
groups. Rather, it is a disproportionately minority phenome-
 
Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673, 684 (1995). 
 95. Meares, supra note 1, at 340; accord Bellin, supra note 73, at 1505 
(“[T]he NYPD uses stop-and-frisk to find guns and deter gun-carrying.”). 
 96. Complaint ¶¶ 83–84, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198. 
 97. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49 (1999). Ten years earlier, 
another class action alleged that Chicago police would improperly “arrest, . . . 
charge and . . . detain . . . persons for disorderly conduct . . . with no intent to 
prosecute such charges in court.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 104 F.R.D. 404, 
404 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Approximately 100,000 people were arrested in these op-
erations. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 5. 
 98. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 6, 11. 
 99. There is an enormous empirical literature to this effect. A useful 
summary is Janet J. Lauritsen & Robert J. Sampson, Minorities, Crime, and 
Criminal Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58, 65–70 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Peterson & Krivo, supra note 78; Robert J. 
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Col-
lective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918, 919, 923 (1997). 
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non.100 Not only impoverished African Americans but also black 
middle-class cohorts are disproportionately represented in ex-
tremely poor urban neighborhoods.101 One side effect of this is 
that urban violent crime impacts minority groups more griev-
ously than non-minority groups.102 In 1993, the year before 
James Wilson wrote his Times op-ed, the African-American 
homicide victimization rate per 100,000 population was 47; the 
white rate was 6.4.103 From the perspective of its political spon-
sors, SQF has to train upon African-American and Hispanic 
neighborhoods not because of some theory of race and crime but 
because that is where the murders—the murders of minority 
citizens—are happening.104 
If American cities were making progress toward meaning-
ful racial integration, this nexus between policing and race 
might be expected to have waned by today. But despite increas-
ing ethnic and racial diversity within cities, racial segregation 
endures in many cities.105 Indeed, as many American cities are 
 
 100. See Glenn Firebaugh & Chad R. Farrell, Still Large, but Narrowing: 
The Sizable Decline in Racial Neighborhood Inequality in Metropolitan Ameri-
ca, 1980–2010, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 139, 144 (2016) (analyzing data from 1980 to 
2010 and finding a “greater concentration of blacks and Hispanics in poorer-
than-average neighborhoods” in urban contexts); see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON, 
GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 
(2012) (describing racial character of concentrated poverty in Chicago). For 
correlations between poverty, crime, and racial segregation, see Edward S. 
Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation and Crime: The Effect of Black Social 
Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 SOC. FORCES 1325, 1345 
(1996) (“[S]egregation is a major predictor of the rates of homicide and robbery 
among blacks.”). 
 101. Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of 
Three Segregations, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 354, 354–55 (2012) (finding that black 
poverty concentration stems from the complex interaction of racial segrega-
tion, poverty-status segregation within race, and segregation of blacks from 
high- and middle-income members of other racial groups). 
 102. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: 
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474 
(2000) (“In urban areas, many poor people of color live in conditions of residen-
tial segregation, concentrated poverty, and unemployment that predict the 
breakdown of community social processes, which in turn predict elevated 
crime rates.”). 
 103. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 10 
fig.1.5 (2007). 
 104. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing defendant’s argument that “the apparently dispro-
portionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics can be explained on race-neutral 
grounds by police deployment to high crime areas and by racial differences in 
crime rates”). 
 105. See John R. Logan et al., Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: 
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as “hypersegregated” today as they were in 1970.106 The experi-
ence of residential segregation, moreover, has remained espe-
cially stable for African Americans regardless of class. Nation-
ally, the proportion of African-American areas lacking racial 
diversity has “remained stubbornly set at around 8.6 percent” 
throughout the 1990s.107 Even “relatively advantaged” black 
neighborhoods “continue to be unique in the degree to which 
they are spatially linked with communities of severe concen-
trated disadvantage.”108 
The argument in favor of SQF, in short, rests on its ability 
to mitigate the costs of violent crime particularly associated 
with urban minority-dominated neighborhoods. To the extent 
that areas of concentrated poverty persist in cities, and to the 
extent they are predominantly black or Hispanic, SQF might 
even be viewed as a form of affirmative action. It is a positive 
subsidy to impoverished minority communities, a surplus pro-
vision of the public good of policing. In former New York police 
Commissioner Ray Kelly’s words, the real problem with urban 
policing is then that African Americans “are being 
understopped” in light of the violent crime experienced by black 
communities.109 
2. The Difficulties of SQF as Violent Crime Control 
The benefits of SQF, however, are more qualified than its 
advocates suggest. I analyze here how those benefits are 
properly characterized before turning to the policy’s costs. Fo-
 
Two Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 7 (2004) (finding that despite 
modest declines in racial segregation, blacks remain more segregated from 
whites than Hispanics or Asians). 
 106. Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in 
Black Hypersegregation, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1027–28 (2015). 
 107. Steven R. Holloway et al., The Racially Fragmented City? Neighbor-
hood Racial Segregation and Diversity Jointly Considered, 64 PROF. GEOGRA-
PHER 63, 69–70 (2012). 
 108. Patrick Sharkey, Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class, 
119 AM. J. SOC. 903, 905–06 (2014). 
 109. Paybarah, supra note 83; accord sources cited supra note 83. For 
scholarly defenses of SQF and its effect on violent crime, see David Rudovsky 
& Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in 
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 141 (2013) (describing Rosen-
thal’s endorsement of SQF on public safety grounds); Bellin, supra note 73, at 
1538 (“[A] high volume of arbitrary frisks is essential to effectively deterring 
gun possession.”). Bellin’s position, however, is more nuanced and careful than 
Rosenthal’s insofar as he concludes that SQF is not narrowly tailored as re-
quired by the application of strict scrutiny under Equal Protection doctrine. 
Id. at 1546. 
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cusing solely upon SQF’s suppression of violent crime, there are 
both reasons for skepticism of the magnitude of the ensuing 
welfare gain and grounds for treating such benefits as morally 
problematic. These concerns, I stress, bear on SQF’s efficacy, 
not the moral urgency of addressing the hecatomb of contempo-
rary urban homicide in cities such as Chicago today.  
If there is no convincing evidence that SQF in fact mean-
ingfully improves policing outcome—and if there is also evi-
dence that it has substantial deleterious effects—then it should 
be considered a moral wrong in the same class as employment 
discrimination or housing segregation. Moreover, evidence that 
SQF imposes concentrated costs on minority populations with-
out remotely commensurate benefits points toward the need for 
a distinct, programmatic remedy such as disparate impact lia-
bility. 
I highlight four interrelated grounds for concern. First, the 
evidence for an absolute crime-control effect from SQF is sur-
prisingly fragile. Second, the evidence of a marginal effect from 
SQF in comparison to other methods is nonexistent. What evi-
dence exists suggests many of the crime-control benefits of SQF 
might be obtained without its aggregate, racially disparate as-
pect. Third, and relatedly, the claim that SQF disproportionate-
ly benefits African Americans rests on complex and controver-
sial assumptions. Finally, even assuming firm evidence of large 
crime-control gains from SQF, there is a normative objection to 
the state taking credit for those benefits when the governmen-
tal entities responsible for SQF also contributed to minority 
segregation into neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. 
First, notwithstanding Sherman’s Kansas City study, “it is 
very difficult to connect [SQF] to any crime reduction.”110 Two 
subsequent efforts at replicating the former study, in Indianap-
olis and Pittsburgh, have produced ambivalent results.111 The 
Indianapolis study, for example, found that homicide rates de-
creased in one of two treatment areas, but remained unchanged 
in the other.112 Its authors concluded that the “present state of 
 
 110. Meares, supra note 1, at 344. 
 111. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE 
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32–33 (2014) (describing and discussing both studies). 
 112. Edmund F. McGarrell, Steven Chermak, Alexander Weiss & Jeremy 
Wilson, Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMI-
NOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 119, 136–37 (2001). 
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knowledge does not allow us to answer the theoretical ques-
tions of what produced the effects observed in Kansas City.”113  
A meta-analysis of six policing experiments involving in-
creased police patrols in North and South America reexamined 
the Pittsburgh data. This data found that while the earlier 
studies had found a statistically significant reduction in gun vi-
olence, alternative specifications “strongly suggest[] the esti-
mated drop in shots-fired incidents was due at least in part to a 
preintervention trend, a seasonal pattern, or chance.”114 Never-
theless, the authors of the meta-study found themselves ulti-
mately “generally favorable” to the method pioneered in Kansas 
City, even as they raised substantial concern as to whether 
Sherman’s experiment could be scaled up beyond the level of 
small neighborhoods.115 
In an operational context, SQF fares less well. Rigorous 
empirical studies of SQF’s post-1994 deployment are rare. Ex-
isting results, though, provide sparse support for its crime-
control effects. For example, a study of the effects of SQF on 
burglary and robbery rates in New York between 2003 and 
2010 found “few significant effects.”116 Another quantitative 
study of New York found that “the number of shooting inci-
dents was virtually unchanged during the years in which stops 
and frisks grew at an extraordinary rate,” suggesting that it 
was “extremely unlikely that these stops could have reduced 
the homicide rate by reducing gun ownership or carrying.”117  
 
 113. Id. at 145. 
 114. Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Il-
legal Gun Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 227, 238, 245–46 (2006). 
 115. Id. at 248–49. 
 116. Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on 
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003–2010, 31 JUST. 
Q. 96, 97 (2012). Rosenberg and Fornango persuasively argue that a 2008 
study that did find a negative relation between SQF and crime was methodo-
logically flawed because it failed to include precinct-level socioeconomic effects 
or year fixed effects. Id. at 103. 
 117. David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Meth-
odological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 181–82 (2014); accord Jeffrey A. Fagan et 
al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of 
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND PO-
LICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. 
White eds., 2010) (reporting study findings that increased rates of police stops 
and decreased efficiency of those stops disproportionately affects particular 
neighborhoods). 
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The most detailed and comprehensive study of overall 
trends in recent crime rates in New York, by Franklin Zimring, 
also concluded that in the New York City context, “there is no 
way to separately measure the value added by aggressive in-
tervention in New York City.”118  
A leading criminologist and the paramount expect on New 
York policing, Zimring has seemed of two minds about street 
policing in general. On the one hand, he has identified “aggres-
sive” measures such as hot-spot policing, the elimination of 
open-air drug markets, and firearm reduction as “probably” 
successful.119 On the other hand, he has been much more confi-
dent that “data driven crime mapping and patrol strategy 
management” and the hiring of police officers did likely have 
large and negative effects on crime rates.120 At the very best, 
Zimring’s evidence leaves open the possibility that SQF had 
some role to play in crime reduction. It casts little light on the 
magnitude of that role, and it has little to say about whether 
the same gains in public order might have been achieved 
through alternate means. 
Another potential means of examining SQF’s impact is to 
examine the aftermath of the policy’s unexpected discontinu-
ance. But there has also been no detailed study of what hap-
pened after the New York City Police Department reduced the 
number of stops dramatically in 2013. In the three years after 
that decline began, however, murder rates have remained “es-
sentially flat.”121  
In Chicago, a different and more complicated story pre-
vails. A sharp rise in murder and decline in arrests followed the 
November 2015 release of long-suppressed video footage of a fa-
tal police shooting that provoked sharp public outcry against 
the Chicago Police Department.122 Immediately thereafter, in 
 
 118. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S 
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 148–49 (2012). 
 119. Id. at 145. 
 120. Id. at 147–48. I am grateful to John Rappaport for discussion on this 
point. 
 121. Toni Monkovic, Ted Cruz Was Wrong on Murders in New York, but 
Perception Is Hard To Shake, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/04/22/upshot/ted-cruz-was-wrong-on-murders-in-new-york-but 
-perception-is-hard-to-shake.html. 
 122. Rob Arthur & Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked—and Arrests De-
clined—in Chicago Right After the Laquan McDonald Video Release, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 11, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun 
-violence-spiked-and-arrests-declined-in-chicago-right-after-the-laquan 
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January 2016, changes to how stops and frisks are recorded—
but no change to operational policy—went into effect.123 Given 
that the highly critical public reaction to the video likely had a 
significant effect on multiple aspects of police morale and hence 
police behavior, it is hard to disentangle any discrete effect 
from changes in SQF policy from changes due to the critical 
public reaction to the demoralizing release of evidence of un-
lawful police violence. Those who rush to judgment or seek to 
cast blame based on the Chicago (or New York) data trends 
may well be ensnared unwittingly in a species of motivated 
reasoning.  
The empirical case for a crime-control benefit from SQF, in 
short, does not stand on strong foundations.124 While there is 
some empirical support for an effect from SQF in small-scale 
experiments, there is no existing evidence that this effect can 
be replicated at a citywide level.125 The weakness of its eviden-
tiary predicate contrasts with firmer evidentiary basis for other 
kinds of reform, including the deployment of more officers and 
the use of more data-driven approaches. More than forty years 
after Wilson’s initial intervention, therefore, SQF remains 
largely predicated on a mere prediction about the effect of in-
tensive street stops on violent crime levels. 
Second, econometric studies of SQF’s effect on crime of the 
kind discussed above aim to isolate the marginal effect of the 
policy after controlling for all other relevant variables. In effect, 
they strive to hold all else constant and then search for an ef-
 
-mcdonald-video-release. 
 123. See id. 
 124. At least one commentator cites a 2006 study of a multi-pronged anti-
narcotics strategy in New York City public housing as evidence of the efficacy 
of SQF. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism 
and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1251, 
n.295 (2015). But the study in question involved a program that “combined 
several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent and control drug use: 
police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention, coordination of services 
with health and social service agencies, and development of the social infra-
structure of formal and informal supervision groups in the housing authori-
ties.” Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in 
New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 417 
(2006). It is plainly incorrect to rely on this sort of multi-pronged effort, in 
which the effects of one policy might be contingent on the manner in which 
another is operationalized as a basis for drawing inferences about the narrow-
er tactic of SQF. 
 125. For a challenge to the small-scale effects, see EPP ET AL., supra note 
111, at 153–54 (“Nor is it clear that investigatory stops help reduce the crime 
rate . . . .”). 
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fect of SQF on crime rates. But the assumption that all else 
remains constant is an obvious artifice. A police force that fore-
goes SQF is likely to employ an alternative policing strategy 
that does not involve nonconsensual interventions or facially 
racial disparities in treatment. The marginal negative effect on 
crime-control of shifting from SQF to an alternative modality of 
policing is likely to be smaller than the absolute effect of simply 
foregoing SQF entirely. A police force that chooses to forego 
SQF can redeploy the substantial personnel resources that it 
occupies for other tactical uses. 
There are, moreover, other modalities of policing that are 
positively associated with crime control in rigorous empirical 
studies. Consider, for example, the empirical literature on “hot-
spot policing,” a technique that has some parallels with SQF, 
but that can also be distinguished from it. Hot-spot policing in-
volves “the application of police interventions at very small ge-
ographic units of analysis.”126 A range of studies and meta-
studies suggests that the highly localized deployment of officers 
has a meaningful and statistically significant effect on crime 
rates.127 
Hot-spot policing and SQF have some similarities, but 
their differences are critical. To begin, there is a question of 
scale. I have already stressed more than once that SQF (as I 
use the term) involves tens or hundreds of thousands of arrests. 
Hot-spot policing does not require similarly massive deploy-
ments. The one study of an existing SQF policy to consider the 
question concluded that deployments tended to occur across ar-
eas that were too large to be characterized as “hot spots” as 
that term is technically used.128 Even if the distinction in scale 
 
 126. ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLAC-
ES 9 (2010). More generally, proactive policing of various kinds (not necessari-
ly involving stops) is also associated with crime-control effects. Charis E. 
Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 
CRIMINOLOGY 57, 62 (2010). 
 127. Cody W. Telep & David Weisburd, What Is Known About the Effec-
tiveness of Police Practices in Reducing Crime and Disorder?, 15 POLICE Q. 
331, 333–34 (2012) (“The evidence base for hot spots policing is particularly 
strong . . . .”). For exemplary studies using randomized and controlled experi-
ments, see Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder 
Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008); An-
thony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A 
Randomized Control Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541 (1999). 
 128. Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 79–80. This factor can also be used 
in inapposite and illogical ways. Id. at 85 (noting that “High Crime Area” was 
often provided as a justification for stops in public housing putatively target-
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between SQF and hot-spot policing is hard to quantify, in prac-
tice it seems easy enough to draw.129  
Moreover, hot-spot policing does not require stops, let alone 
frisks or arrests to be effective. There is instead evidence that 
“increased police presence alone” dampens crime rates, and the 
“strongest” impact is associated with “situational prevention” 
strategies, that “disrupt situational dynamics that allow crime 
to occur,” for example by “razing abandoned buildings.”130 One 
study of street stops at “microgeographic” hot spots examined 
in one-week increments in New York generated reductions in 
crime, but cautioned that “evidence suggests that crime preven-
tion can be achieved without resorting to an unrestricted SQF 
policy.”131 In this New York data, moreover, SQF was pursued 
“at the expense” of other strategies, leaving open questions 
about the “potential of other policing strategies.”132 
Hot spot policing plainly requires a nontrivial number of 
officers. So it is important to emphasize that my argument here 
solely concerns the style of policing, not the sheer volume of of-
ficers deployed.133 And increasing stops or arrests, do not ap-
pear to be a necessary component of hot-spot policing. To the 
contrary, in one leading study, the authors noted approvingly 
that officers in the treatment condition (i.e., engaged in hot-
 
ing trespassers, but without any explanation of why the suspicion of trespass 
arose). 
 129. In Part I.B infra, I develop a catalog of costs associated with SQF. 
Many of these costs flow from the sheer volume and concentration of stops. 
Because hot-spot policing is more focused, many of these criticisms do not ap-
ply to it. This is another reason to distinguish hot-spot policing and SQF qua 
urban policing strategies. 
 130. Telep & Weisburd, supra note 127, at 333–41; accord Braga & Bond, 
supra note 127, at 599 (reporting results from a controlled, randomized study 
in Lowell, Massachusetts, and suggesting that the strongest crime-prevention 
benefits were driven by situational strategies that attempted to modify the 
criminal opportunity structure at crime and disorder hot-spot locations). 
 131. David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question and Frisk Practices Deter 
Crime? Evidence at Microunits of Space and Time, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 31, 48–49 (2015); id. at 47 (noting that in their estimate, high-volume 
use of SFQ would produce “only a 2% decline in crime,” which they character-
ize as “relatively small”). 
 132. Id. at 49–50. Another study conducted by Weisburd similarly finds 
“modest” effects that are concentrated in space and time. Alese Wooditch & 
David Weisburd, Using Space-Time Analysis To Evaluate Criminal Justice 
Programs: An Application to Stop-Question-Frisk Practices, 32 J. QUANT. 
CRIM. 191, 191 (2015). 
 133. Cf. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring To Esti-
mate the Effects of Police on Crime: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1244, 1244 
(2002) (presenting evidence of a “large, negative impact of police on crime”). 
  
2424 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2397 
 
spot policing) were not evaluated on their stop count, but ra-
ther were held “accountable for reducing citizen calls for service 
and for ameliorating social and physical incivilities in targeted 
hot-spot areas.”134 A recent meta-analysis of nineteen studies of 
hot-spot policing separately examined the effects of two distinct 
versions of that policy that involved either increasing the vol-
ume of traditional policing or using a problem-solving ap-
proach.135 Three of the ten existing studies of the traditional po-
licing model found small positive effects on crime reduction.136 
But the overall mean effect size of problem-oriented hot-spot 
policing was twice the effect size of the traditional policing 
model.137 It would seem that the decision to simply increase 
traditional policing activities at hot spots is dominated in prac-
tice by problem-solving measures. 
The contrast between SQF and hot-spot policing usefully 
underscores a more general point: policing is not a single, un-
differentiated public good. Rather, policing is mutative and 
takes several forms. It can entail the pursuit of diverse ends of 
crime-control, order-maintenance, and social provision, with di-
vergent tools.138 Police forces now engaged in SQF have at other 
times employed other, quite different approaches, which focus 
instead on service provision,139 community relations,140 or 
prophylactic street policing. Some of these policies aim to re-
duce crime; others, such as community policing, seek to “build[] 
a reservoir of public support” to tap in moments of strain.141 
These different services can be bundled in different ways. In at 
least some of the jurisdictions in which SQF is employed, 
neighborhoods subject to aggressive street policing do not nec-
 
 134. Braga & Bond, supra note 127, at 599. 
 135. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Crime: An 
Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 640, 655–56 
(2014). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 656. 
 138. For an excellent survey of diverse views on the police function, see 
THE FUTURE OF POLICING (Jennifer M. Brown ed., 2014). 
 139. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE 
MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 200–26 (1968) (de-
scribing a “service style” of policing). 
 140. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1593 (2002) (describing an effort by police in Chicago to build relations 
with African-American churches). 
 141. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO: A TALE OF 
THREE CITIES 247 (2006) (discussing community policing in Chicago in the 
early 1990s). 
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essarily receive high levels of other policing services.142 Indeed, 
racial segregation at the municipal level is systematically cor-
related to depressed levels of public service provision.143 
In Chicago, for example, African-American and Hispanic 
neighborhoods are subject to SQF on the one hand, but on the 
other hand experience substantially longer delays than non-
minority neighborhoods when seeking police aid via 911 calls.144 
Policing is thus both under-supplied and over-provided simul-
taneously. 
Defenders of SQF therefore mislead when they equate SQF 
with a police force “focus[ing] its resources where people most 
need protection.”145 Rather, it is both possible—and in fact often 
seems to be the case—that SQF is accompanied by serious defi-
ciencies in respect to other elements of the bundle of police ser-
vices. Estimation of the margin costs of ending SQF must as a 
result account for the possibility of variance across these other 
elements of the police function. 
Third, the assumption of SQF’s advocates, particularly in 
New York, has been that its benefits accrue to the minority res-
idents of high-crime neighborhoods more than they accrue to 
residents of low-crime neighborhoods.146 Implicitly, these advo-
cates are drawing a comparison between SQF and affirmative 
action. Both, they suggest, are policies that disproportionately 
benefit African-American and Hispanic minorities.  
But consider another possibility: since the 1960s, the fear 
of crime has been a concern that has powerfully mobilized 
white electorates.147 It may be that among the gains of SQF is a 
reduction in the fear of crime,148 and that this gain is diffused 
 
 142. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 41–42 
(2010) (noting disparate access to public-order resources in cities such as Los 
Angeles). 
 143. Jessica Trounstine, Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods, 60 
AM. J. POL. SCI, 709, 720 (2016). 
 144. Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2013) (describing longer wait times for 911 calls in minority neigh-
borhoods). 
 145. Mac Donald, supra note 83. 
 146. See sources cited supra note 83. 
 147. See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Puni-
tive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 235 (2007); see also Dennis D. 
Loo & Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The “Law and Order” 
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 148. See generally Jonathan P. Jackson, A Psychological Perspective on 
Vulnerability in the Fear of Crime, 15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 365 (2009) (exam-
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among the wider urban population. The latter, of course, is typ-
ically much larger than the urban subpopulation subject to 
SQF. Even assuming there is a substantial marginal crime-
control gain in substituting SQF for the next-best policy,149 it is 
necessarily the case that whereas the (predominantly minority) 
residents of impoverished neighborhoods experience both costs 
and benefits, the (predominantly white) non-residents of other 
neighborhoods experience only benefits (albeit in expectation at 
a much lower rate). There are also likely to be many more 
white non-residents of targeted areas than minority non-
residents. The former group benefits from being able to access 
more of the city, as well as from a more general reduction in 
their fear of crime.150  
Depending on the magnitude of these various costs and 
benefits for different racial groups, it is at least possible that 
the adoption of SQF might create larger net benefits for the 
class of white nonresidents as a whole than for the class of mi-
nority residents of highly policed neighborhoods in a manner 
that is racially regressive—even without accounting for the po-
tential costs of SQF.151 
The claim that SQF disproportionately benefits minorities 
is an important part of the moral case in favor of the policy. 
Closer examination of the assumptions underlying the claim, 
however, uncovers its contingency. It is hardly clear that—
again, even bracketing the costs of SQF—it is true that a dis-
proportionate share of the social benefits of SQF run to minori-
 
ining factors that impact fear of crime). 
 149. But see supra text accompanying notes 126–30 (suggesting that hot 
spot policing is better supported empirically as a crime-control measure than 
SQF). 
 150. It seems likely to me that some non-minorities gain satisfaction from 
policies that confirm their prior belief that minorities are responsible for social 
ills such as crime, a belief that helps obscure the ways in which both national 
and state social provision have long disproportionately benefited non-minority 
populations. For the canonical historical analysis on this point, see IRA 
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY 
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005). SQF, that is, is a 
policy that simultaneously confirms racial resentment and assuages white 
guilt. As such, it has large psychological payoffs for the correctly disposed non-
minority populations. See also Michael Tesler, The Conditions Ripe for Racial 
Spillover Effects, 26 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 101, 101 (2015) (summarizing ev-
idence of continued high levels of racial resentment). 
 151. What if African-American residents subject to SQF do not benefit from 
the policy and do not support it? If SQF nonetheless mitigates white fear of 
crime, the policy will have an unmitigated regressive distributive effect. Ste-
ven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 ECON. J. F402, F412 (2006). 
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ty communities. Much depends on the welfare effects from 
crime reductions and from mitigation of crime-related fears. 
Fourth, the final reason for skepticism of the positive case 
for SQF based on its crime-control effects is not based on empir-
ical data or calculations of its welfare-related consequences. 
Rather, it is moral in nature, and depends on a distinctive (and 
controversial) moral logic: the idea that “[n]o one shall be per-
mitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his 
own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to 
acquire property by his own crime.”152 
Applying that concededly raw intuition to the case of SQF 
reveals the following line of argument: The problem of violent 
crime to which SQF responds flows from the existence of neigh-
borhoods of concentrated (and racialized) poverty. Although 
there are many forces molding the latter, governmental actors 
at the state and local level have a large share of responsibility. 
Those same governmental bodies (if not the exact same indi-
vidual politicians) also resorted to SQF.153  
But having exposed minority communities to the harm of 
high violent crime rates, governmental bodies cannot then 
“take advantage” of this wrong to seek a measure of legal and 
policy leeway that they otherwise would not have. At a mini-
mum, they should elect the policing strategy that imposes the 
minimum burden on minority communities that as a result of 
persisting state policy have been subjected to concentrated pov-
erty and high crime rates. Policing, that is, should be subject to 
a Hippocratic constraint.  
The threshold premise of this argument—that states and 
localities bear a measure of responsibility for concentrated, mi-
nority poverty—has substantial support in the historical and 
empirical literature. To be sure, “macrostructural” forces such 
as the deindustrialization of central cities and the exit of some 
middle-class and wealthy African Americans have driven the 
growth of concentrated, racialized poverty.154 But these forces 
 
 152. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). 
 153. In Chicago, the argument might well be personalized given the 
lengthy tenure of Richard M. Daley in office. 
 154. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of 
Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 42 (John 
Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995). More recently, the financial crisis has 
deepened the effect of segregation. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial 
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 634 
(2010) (“[T]he housing boom and the immense profits it generated frequently 
came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner sub-
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have been magnified by “deliberate policy decisions to concen-
trate minorities and the poor in public housing.”155  
In Chicago, for example, alderman and the mayor thwarted 
efforts from the 1940s onward to disperse African Americans 
outside traditionally black neighborhoods.156 Across the country, 
zoning restrictions and permitting requirements have been ex-
tensively deployed to perpetuate racially “exclusionary” resi-
dential patterns.157 
The implications of state involvement in the creation of 
concentrated racialized poverty turn on the sort of moral fault 
one attributes to a collective entity such as a municipality, the 
precise mix of state action and private actions responsible for 
residential segregation, and the extent to which any historical 
responsibility is mitigated by the passage of time and the bur-
dens that remediation would impose on innocent third-
parties.158 I do not aim to resolve that complex suite of ques-
tions here. Rather, my more limited claim is that a city’s claims 
on behalf of SQF must at a minimum be contextualized by its 
 
urbs who were targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of na-
tional banks and subjected to discriminatory lending practices.”). The best his-
torical case-study is Thomas Sugrue’s canonical history of post-war Detroit. 
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALI-
TY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996). 
 155. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 154, at 43. See generally Erika K. Wil-
son, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No Child Left Be-
hind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 649–51 (2011) 
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial resi-
dential segregation in the suburbs and urban cities). Such policies also existed 
at the federal level. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). For 
a recent accounting in the legal scholarship, see Sarah Schindler, Architectur-
al Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the 
Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1955–56 (2015) (discussing the role of 
the Federal Housing Authority in fostering urban racial segregation). 
 156. See ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND 
HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940–1960, at 23–24, 64–68, 222–23 (1983) (discussing 
political resistance to the diffusion of public housing, motivated by opposition 
to racial integration); accord D. BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER: 
THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC HOUSING 85–86 (2009). Private violence 
also played a large role in Chicago. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 215–18. 
 157. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies To Reduce 
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 
888–89 (2006); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary 
Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1667, 1667–73 (2013). 
 158. An additional complication arises if a municipality that adopts SQF 
simultaneously pursues policies that either entrench or preserve concentrated 
minority poverty. 
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general historical responsibility for the burdens imposed by 
concentrated poverty, particularly on the racial minorities 
whose efforts to move beyond that condition in search of em-
ployment and educational opportunities have so often been 
thwarted.159 At an absolute minimum, it would seem appropri-
ate to demand a heightened burden of proof for claims about 
the benefits of disparate crime-control measures tendered by 
the very entity responsible for racial segregation.  
Stated in brief then, my fourth point is that the institu-
tional author of racial segregation should do no further harm to 
minorities when it addresses the costs of such segregation. 
Having created the problem that SQF is intended to address, 
municipalities have no entitlement to a benefit of empirical 
doubt. More ambitiously, cities’ partial culpability for the un-
derlying condition of concentrated poverty might justify a de-
mand for special efforts to ensure that no policy response to 
crime imposes a disproportionate share of costs on the legatees 
of historical discrimination, or that denies them a dispropor-
tionate share of its benefits. 
To summarize then, this Section has examined the crime-
control benefits of SQF. The evidence for those is surprisingly 
fragile. The case for thinking SQF has marginal benefits in 
comparison to a next-best policy option such as hot-spot polic-
ing is even shakier. Accounting for SQF’s more diffuse effect on 
the fear of crime, moreover, suggests that defenses of SQF as a 
form of affirmative action may well fail. Finally, an analysis 
based on the state’s historical responsibilities for the underly-
ing conditions that motivate SQF suggests a need to view the 
state’s celebration of the policy’s benefits with a measure of 
skepticism. 
C. THE ECOLOGICAL AND DYNAMIC COSTS OF SQF 
This Section turns from SQF’s putative benefits to its costs. 
In my view, SQF has an intertwined set of individual and col-
lective costs that largely (but not exclusively) sound in an 
equality-related rather than a Fourth Amendment register. My 
starting assumption is that SQF’s costs, no less than its bene-
fits, cannot be properly understood or evaluated once they are 
detached from the historical origins of concentrated poverty. 
 
 159. On the difficulty of African-American exit from concentrated poverty 
via economic improvement, see MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENC-
ES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 24–27 (1999). 
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Nor can they be evaluated without thinking carefully about the 
ways in which SQF might perpetuate the underlying conditions 
of social and racial stratification into concentrated poverty. In 
short, rather than analyzing racial discrimination as a “single-
point outcome,” I embrace here the dominant emphasis in re-
cent sociological scholarship on “modeling discrimination as a 
process.”160 
I identify eight pathways by which SQF can impose harms 
on individuals and communities defined by race. I began the 
analysis of costs by focusing on the immediate encounter be-
tween police and an individual. Having documented costs in 
that proximate context, I then widen my lens to capture a di-
verse array of adverse spillovers from that immediate encoun-
ter, not only to the individual, but also for his or her social net-
work, and (for racial minorities) his or her larger racial cohort.  
The latter effects of SQF, it should be noted, diffuse 
through social networks and families.161 Several critically de-
pend upon “vicious cycles,” or positive feedback mechanisms 
that entangle individual and neighborhood-level effects,162 often 
with regressive distributive consequences. More generally, it is 
plausible to view all eight causal pathways as intertwined and, 
to an extent, mutually reinforcing. 
First, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized that even 
brief stops and frisks have immediate and substantial costs. 
Chief Justice Warren described even a temporary police stop as 
“a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may 
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is 
not to be undertaken lightly.”163 In subsequent cases, however, 
the Court has tended to downplay the immediate psychological 
and dignitary costs of being stopped.164 
 
 160. Devah Pager & Hannah Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination in 
Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 
188 (2008). 
 161. Because not all have been rigorously empirically tested, I will careful-
ly identify what data exists respecting each pathway. Where data is absent, I 
will offer (with appropriate caveats) reasoned hypotheses. 
 162. Mitchell Duneier argues that “the black ghetto has been the site of a 
series of vicious cycles in which space plays a distinctive role.” MITCHELL 
DUNEIER, GHETTO: THE INVENTION OF A PLACE, THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 223 
(2016). I stress the role of neighborhood rather than “space” in the following. 
 163. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968). 
 164. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 338–39 
(2013). 
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But ethnographic data and qualitative studies demonstrate 
that Chief Justice Warren’s initial intuition was correct. The 
immediate toll of a nonconsensual police intrusion—even ab-
sent physical content or formal consequence—is substantial. 
Perhaps the best evidence derives from a recent survey of 1200 
young men in New York conducted by Amanda Geller and col-
leagues. The latter found that contact with the police (primarily 
in the form of Terry stops) was consistently associated with 
persisting “stigma,” “trauma,” “anxiety,” and “depressive symp-
toms.”165  
On reflection, it should be no surprise that these effects 
flow from a Terry stop. The latter is an unexpected encounter 
with heavily armed police, typically characterized by a sense of 
utter helplessness and a sharp fear of violence and deadly 
force.166 This fear may be amplified by a worry of more pro-
longed detention, a real concern in a jurisdiction where police 
have arrest quotas to fill.167 This psychological toll is not imme-
diately visible. It may be shameful even to confess. These are, 
perhaps, the least troubling explanations for why such costs 
have largely fallen out of judicial accounts of SQF. 
Second, a different, racial asymmetry afflicts judicial con-
sideration of the risks of bodily harm attendant on a Terry stop. 
On the one hand, the Court has punctiliously attended to the 
risk of bodily harm to officers during a stop.168 On the other 
hand, the Court has been largely silent about the possibility 
that Terry stops expose the individual subject to police atten-
tion to a substantial risk of physical violence.169  
 
 165. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of 
Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321–22 (2014). 
 166. For a vivid account of the associated dignitary harms, see Nicholas K. 
Pert, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd 
.html (“Essentially, I incorporated into my daily life the sense that I might 
find myself up against a wall or on the ground with an officer’s gun at my 
head.”). 
 167. This may have been the case in New York. Joseph Goldstein, Stop-
and-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-focuses-on 
-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (describing evidence that police officers were told 
to meet quotas in New York City). 
 168. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–415 (1997) (stressing 
the risk of harm to officers while characterizing the cost to those under the 
control of the officers of being physically moved as “minimal”). 
 169. The Fourth Amendment provides limited protection from non-deadly 
force. The Court employs a loose standard to review excessive non-deadly force 
claims. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1988) (employing a reasona-
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Nor has it accounted for the possibility that these risks will 
be positively correlated with minority status. Recent empirical 
work by Roland Fryer using the Terry-stop-related records of 
New York’s police found “large racial differences” in police use 
of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing, and pushing 
individuals into a wall or onto the ground.170 Even assuming 
perfectly compliant behavior, African Americans were twenty-
one percent more likely to experience force than whites.171 In 
Chicago, Wesley Skogan has found higher rates of nonlethal 
force in the context of stops of blacks than in white citizen 
stops.172  
Given such large racial differentials in the use of force, it 
would hardly be surprising if a large proportion of the innocent 
minority residents of high-crime neighborhood who are stopped 
and frisked objected to aggressive SQF even if it had public 
safety benefits that diffused to their benefit.173 
Third, the effects of Terry stops on the individuals subject-
ed to police attention do not expire when their participants are 
released from police control. Rather, negative experiences with 
the police breed cynicism about the law,174 an unwillingness to 
invoke the police’s aid, and a diminished proclivity to comply 
with the law or cooperate with legal authorities. The connec-
tions between negative police treatment and strongly aversive 
views of the police are empirically well grounded, albeit not in 
 
bleness standard). The “indeterminacy” of the standard undermines the risk of 
ex post liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, both of which require a 
“clear” legal rule to be violated. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence 
Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1140–41 (2008). Since Graham does not 
supply a “clear” rule, there is rarely tort liability for excessive non-deadly 
force. Id. 
 170. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in 
Police Uses of Force 3 (July 2016) (unpublished draft), http://scholar 
.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf. For earlier work on increas-
ing usage of disproportionate police force in minority neighborhoods, particu-
larly when that minority was perceived as a demographic threat to a majority, 
see Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 
867, 887–88 (2002) (discussing the changing distribution of police force in New 
York City between the 1970s and the 1990s). 
 171. Fryer, supra note 170, at 31. 
 172. Skogan, supra note 6, at 9. 
 173. See infra text accompanying notes 331–34 (addressing the argument 
that SQF is justified because of minority community support). 
 174. On the concept of legal cynicism, see generally David S. Kirk & An-
drew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistance of Neighbor-
hood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190 (2011) (exploring the consequences of le-
gal cyncisim). 
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contexts where SQF has been implemented.175 But studies from 
the specific cities where SFQ is employed demonstrate vividly 
that intensive street policing has lingering effects on the dispo-
sitions and upon the beliefs of any population routinely subject 
to its rigors. 
For instance, a recent qualitative study of young men liv-
ing in three high-crime neighborhoods in Philadelphia found 
that less than ten percent were willing to call the police “in any 
circumstance,” in part because many had themselves had nega-
tive experiences with the police in the past.176 Tellingly, the 
same study also found resentment directed at police because of 
their failure to respond to 911 calls in a timely fashion.177 Po-
lice, that is, are not seen reflexively in a negative light: it is 
their intrusive and disrespectful behavior toward minority citi-
zens in particular, coupled with their failure to provide non-
coercive public safety, that elicits negative perceptions of the 
badge.  
 
 175. Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: 
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 
42 CRIMINOLOGY, 253, 276–78 (2004) (“To effectively deal with racial distrust 
of the police in the minority community it is important to regulate not only the 
selection of the people whom the police stop, but also the manner in which 
they [sic] conduct stops as well.”). Sherry Colb has raised doubts that such 
“targeting harm” is likely to arise because individuals stopped do not know the 
police’s motivations and therefore cannot know if there is racial animus. Sher-
ry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1500 (1996). After Colb made this argument, 
however, Epp and colleagues demonstrated empirically that minority motor-
ists subject to vehicular stops based on minor regulatory offense are quite 
aware of the fact that similarly situated white motorists would not have been 
stopped, and make strong negative judgments of the police as a result. EPP ET 
AL., supra note 111, at 117–18. 
 176. Patrick J. Carr et al., We Never Call the Cops and Here Is Why: A 
Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighbor-
hoods, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 445, 457 (2007). A parallel result was obtained in a 
study in St. Louis. Rod K. Brunson, Police Don’t Like Black People: African-
American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 71, 71–72 (2007) (detailing study that examined African-American 
mens’ experiences and lack of trust of police). 
 177. Carr et al., supra note 176, at 459; accord Robert J. Sampson & Dawn 
Jelgum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: 
The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 777, 793 
(1998) (finding “perceptions of injustice and alienation from police” in Chicago 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, but rejecting the hypothesis that this 
stems from a “black subculture of deviance”). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnogra-
phy of impoverished Philadelphia confirms this. See also ALICE GOFFMAN, ON 
THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). 
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This study, however, focused on negative experiences of po-
lice, rather than the mere fact of being stopped. Although the 
Philadelphia study suggests that young men in particular per-
ceive police contact generally as negative, it does not test for 
different effects of any police contact.178 In contrast, a recent 
study in New York, examining young subjects specifically in 
areas affected by SQF, found that increasing experience of 
stops (whether negative or positive experiences) diminished 
perceptions of police legitimacy.179 Another study in Chicago 
has found not only that African Americans have “strikingly” 
lower levels of trust in police, but “those caught up in enforce-
ment and investigative stops were less trusting of police” by 
almost forty-five percent.180 A larger body of empirical findings 
from the United States and beyond demonstrates that dimin-
ished police legitimacy is associated with a diminished disposi-
tion to follow the law and a lesser willingness to cooperate with 
police.181 
Relatedly, a high volume of stops concentrated in a specific 
geographically locale can create a vicious-circle feedback loop 
that flows from individual legal cynicism to increased collective 
victimization, and then back again.  
When police are perceived as endorsing excessive force 
against racial minorities, members of that minority population 
tend to become more reluctant to seek police aid. In a time-
series study of how highly publicized incidents of police violence 
in Milwaukee influenced the use of 911, Matthew Desmond, 
Andrew Papachristos and David Kirk found that such incidents 
 
 178. A recent study in St. Louis, Missouri, using a quantitative methodolo-
gy, similarly found that “two-thirds of the young men [in the study] said the 
police are almost never easy to talk to, nearly half said the police are almost 
never polite.” Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Po-
licing in the United States, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 613, 622 (2006). These 
results suggest that it cannot be assumed that most stops are perceived as 
positive or neutral. 
 179. Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable 
Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMP. L. STUD. 751, 
772, figs. 3 & 4 (2014). 
 180. Skogan, supra note 6, at 13. 
 181. For a summary of research into police legitimacy, see Stephen J. 
Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies 
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 
338 (2011) (“[C]ompliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with en-
forcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or the fear of 
consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ beliefs that law enforce-
ment agencies are legitimate.”). 
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have a “clear and significant [negative] impact on citizen crime 
reporting.”182 Other studies have found that when SQF is per-
ceived as being distributed on racial grounds (perhaps because 
African Americans and Hispanics are in fact at a much greater 
per capita risk of being stopped than whites183), cynicism about 
the law and police is likely to be sharpened within minority 
communities. At the margin, violations of the law become more 
frequent.184 As the expected risk of being victimized rises, there-
fore, residents of heavily policed areas become less willing to 
proactively reach out to police. This further lowers the expected 
cost of criminality, rather than alleviating it as SQF’s advo-
cates hoped.185 More crime in turn leads to more aggressive 
SQF, which starts the cycle anew.  
A version of one element of this dynamic has been termed 
the “Ferguson effect.” This rather loaded term captures the 
possibility that high-visibility instances of police misconduct 
lead to increases in crime because of reduced confidence in po-
lice or because of increased risk-averseness on police’s part. Ev-
idence for a broad Ferguson effect, however, is weak and is con-
fined to certain crimes in certain cities.186 If further evidence 
were to emerge of such an effect, it would nevertheless 
strengthen the vicious circle argument developed in the previ-
ous paragraphs. 
Fourth is yet another vicious circle related to legal cyni-
cism: if minorities have consistently negative views of the po-
 
 182. Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting 
in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857, 870 (2016). 
 183. See EPP ET AL., supra note 111, at 117 (“African-Americans and Lati-
nos have developed and share with each other an extensive body of knowledge 
about police behavior and police stops.”); accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED, 
POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 54–57 (2011) (detailing the 
“code” Latinos and blacks in the inner city develop to survive violent commu-
nities). 
 184. See William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1213, 1217 (1998) (“If the police and, through them, the criminal justice sys-
tem, come to be seen as illegitimate, the norms of law-abiding behavior could 
unravel, with the streets becoming less safe, not more so.”). 
 185. See Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context 
and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 105 
(2012) (“In communities with high levels of intersubjectively shared cynicism 
of police misbehavior and the perceived irrelevance of legal rules, violence is 
higher.”). 
 186. The best study of which I am aware is David C. Pyrooz et al., Was 
There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 1, 7 (2016) which finds an effect only for homicide and robbery, and only 
in cities with large impoverished minority communities. 
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lice, and respond to stops accordingly, police may come to antic-
ipate more resistance from those minorities. Shared police ex-
pectations of a greater risk of African-American violence in re-
sponse to a police stop is one potential explanation for the 
higher rates of force for black suspects that Fryer finds in the 
New York SQF data.187 Consistent with this possibility, greater 
perceived minority threat appears to predict higher levels of po-
lice use of force, controlling for other relevant predictors.188 Ap-
pearances, in this way, influence realities.189 The perception of 
racial disproportionality in stops, on this theory, influences in-
dividual residents’ behavior, which in the aggregate creates ra-
cial differences in violence by police. This of course merely 
strengthens minorities’ negative expectations of police.190 In 
this way, large racial disparities in the physical harms associ-
ated with SQF can be reconciled with the “nearly uniform sup-
port for the principle of equal treatment” found in polling da-
ta.191 
Fifth, just as legal cynicism leads to higher victimization 
rates, so too can the carceral consequences of SQF have nega-
tive effects. “[M]ore punitive police enforcement and parole 
surveillance” leads to a higher frequency of repeat admissions 
from a given neighborhood, which “begets more incarceration,” 
which in turn begets more crime.192 To the extent SQF does not 
result in arrests or incarceration, of course, this dynamic is 
forestalled. 
Sixth, SQF might solidify stereotypical assumptions about 
the correlation of race and criminality. When neighborhoods 
targeted for SQF are predominantly African American and 
 
 187. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321–28 (2002) (finding subjects—instructed to act as offic-
ers—were quicker to use force against blacks than whites). 
 188. See Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Di-
versity, and the Deadly Use of Police Force 2–4 (2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
 189. This is an instance of what Adam Samaha calls “[a]ppearance driving 
reality.” Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1563, 1577 (2012). 
 190. The expert report in the New York litigation gestures at this dynamic 
when it explains why propensity score matching is infeasible as a measure of 
testing for discriminatory motives. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 97–98. 
 191. Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice 
and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 299, 309 (2006). 
 192. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in 
New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003). 
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Hispanic, SQF is likely to strengthen the widely shared percep-
tion of a connection between race and crime.193 Careful empiri-
cal studies have demonstrated that the racial composition of a 
neighborhood already provides a cue for people’s estimates of 
its disorderly character194 and its crime rate.195 SQF, especially 
when explicitly justified on the basis of black criminality, works 
as an official imprimatur upon this popular stereotype. And by 
instantiating state policy on the basis of that spurious correla-
tion, it deepens and ratifies racial stereotypes that predate any 
known disparity in crime rates and invidious generalizations 
that depend not on empirics, but rather on profound (and 
harmful) assumptions about racial differences.196  
Consistent with this dynamic, empirical evidence already 
suggests that suspects with darker skin pigmentation are more 
likely to identified as criminal197 and punished more severely198 
than similarly situated lighter-toned suspects. It may also be 
that the tighter perceived correlation between race and crimi-
nality reinforces residential segregation, by “mark[ing] off 
‘black’ from ‘white’ neighborhoods.”199 
Seventh, another probable effect of SQF is a dampening of 
civil participation by residents of affected neighborhoods in 
 
 193. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: 
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (exploring 
the ways in which at the beginning of the twentieth century, policymakers in 
Northern cities began linking crime to African Americans on the basis of ge-
netic and predispositional arguments). 
 194. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319–20 (2004) (finding that perceptions of disorder in a 
neighborhood were better predicted by the racial composition of a neighbor-
hood than by actual disorder). 
 195. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The 
Role of Racial Stereotypes, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718 (2001) (“[T]he percentage 
of a neighborhood’s black population, particularly the percentage [of ] young 
black men, is significantly associated with perceptions of the severity of a 
neighborhood’s crime problem.”). 
 196. Annabelle Lever makes the related and important point that race-
based policing often “reflects racist attitudes, institutions and habits while ob-
scuring its contribution to them.” Annabelle Lever, Why Racial Profiling Is 
Hard To Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
94, 97 (2005) (emphases omitted). 
 197. Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and So-
cial Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous 
Black Criminal, 35 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 1555, 1555–56 (2005). 
 198. Jennifer L. Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and 
the American Racial Order, 86 SOC. FORCES 643, 644 (2007). 
 199. ANDERSON, supra note 142, at 42. 
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ways that, over time, conduce to diminished collective political 
power. Important recent work by Amy Lerman and Vesla 
Weaver has demonstrated empirically that contact with the 
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a 
substantial and statistically significant effect on trust in gov-
ernment.200 In one national sample, “[t]he probability of voting 
declined by 8 percent for those who have been stopped.”201 Once 
again, there is a potent vicious circle in operation here: SQF is 
a form of policing that allocates most of its costs to minorities 
living in concentrated poverty. But the downstream effect of a 
high stop rate is that roughly one in ten of those subjected to 
SQF become less likely to vote. Like felon disenfranchisement 
laws, SQF thus has the effect of sapping low-income minority 
communities’ influence on public policy and on the political dis-
tribution of valued public goods,202 even as it purports to em-
power those communities. 
Eighth, and finally, is yet another potential aggregate-level 
effect—this time upon the level of “collective efficacy” within a 
neighborhood. Developed by the Harvard sociologist Robert 
Sampson, the concept of collective efficacy involves “the linkage 
of mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene.”203 In 
repeated studies, high levels of collective efficacy have been 
found to boost “neighborhoods[’ ability] to realize the common 
values of residents and maintain effective social controls is a 
major source of neighborhood variation in violence” and in par-
ticular homicide.204 Although there is no study of the effect of 
 
 200. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 81, at 150–51 (presenting a range of 
tests reflecting Americans’ levels of trust in government). 
 201. Id. at 222–23. In a separate article, Lerman and Weaver find parallel 
results in a New York sample. Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying 
out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action, 651 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 204 (2014) (finding in a study of New York 
that “witnessing stops that occur with little justification and that feature 
physical force can make people feel occupied and powerless, and can incentiv-
ize disengagement with government”). 
 202. Todd R. Clear, The Effect of High Imprisonment Rates on Communi-
ties, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 116 (2008). 
 203. Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and 
the Social Structure of the City, in ANALYTIC SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHA-
NISMS 227, 232 (P. Demeulenaere ed., 2011). 
 204. Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Effica-
cy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 551 
(2001) (finding that measures of lower collective efficacy in a neighborhood in-
dependently predict increased homicide risk); Robert J. Sampson et al., As-
sessing ‘Neighborhood Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in Re-
search, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 457 (2002) (same); Sampson et al., supra note 
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SQF on levels of collective efficacy, there is little reason to 
think it will be positive. If contact with the police breeds legal 
cynicism, intracommunal violence, anxiety, and an unwilling-
ness to engage politically, it is hard to see how it could foster 
collective efficacy. If that is so, SQF suppresses a key determi-
nant of public safety within neighborhoods. 
In considering these eight pathways, it is important to note 
that in many respects, their effects are likely endure across 
generations. Most impoverished African-American youth, as 
well as a “significant” proportion of middle-income ones, live in 
urban neighborhoods of concentrated poverty of the kind sub-
ject to SQF.205 SQF is likely pivotal in the formation of many 
minority children’s understandings of their status and possibil-
ities in America, an effect compounded by the further fact that 
one in four black children already experiences parental incar-
ceration.206 To think that SQF’s structural harms will be transi-
ent, therefore, is to be far too optimistic. 
This is a long list. Its items, though, should not be viewed 
in isolation. Rather, these mechanisms operate in simultaneous 
and overlapping ways. All of these pathways generate costs 
concentrated on the minority individuals and communities in 
which SQF is imposed. In this, their effects are intersecting 
and cumulative. Impoverished minority individuals, and 
through them their communities, become more demoralized, al-
ienated, anxious, crime-ridden, and politically powerless. The 
net effect of SQF’s eight costs, therefore, is singular: it is to 
maintain and even deepen social and geographic schisms that 
separate neighborhoods and racial groups.  
It is for this reason that SQF cannot be understood as 
merely an individual-level intervention. It sets in motion a 
range of important social processes, largely detrimental to the 
shared interests of a neighborhood and a racial group, in ways 
that reiterate and recapitulate extant racial and social hierar-
chies. 
 
99, at 918. 
 205. Orlando Patterson, The Social and Cultural Matrix of Black Youth, in 
THE CULTURAL MATRIX: UNDERSTANDING BLACK YOUTH 45, 47 (O. Patterson 
& Ethan Fosse eds., 2015). 
 206. SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE 
PRISON BOOM: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INE-
QUALITY 41 (2014) (“For black children . . . the risk of having a father impris-
oned before their fourteenth birthday was one in four.”). 
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These dynamics, finally, may help explain the surprising 
lack of empirical evidence of crime reduction from SQF.207 At an 
aggregate level, communities subject to SQF are likely to see 
their political efficacy, their collective efficacy, and their shared 
commitment to the law wither. One effect of these changes is 
an expected increase in levels of crime. This may offset whatev-
er gains the direct application of SQF achieves partially or in 
full. SQF, in short, is a short-term panacea that in the medium-
term may well prove self-defeating. 
D. THE DISTINCTIVE MORAL WRONG OF SQF 
This Part has so far provided a definition and analysis of 
the positives and negatives of SQF with the aim of refashioning 
the case against SQF. Rather than cabining the inquiry by im-
posing artificial constitutional categories at the threshold, I 
have identified both individual and neighborhood-level costs 
and benefits. With a clear picture of both positives and nega-
tives in hand, it is possible to recapitulate the argument 
against SQF in a more nuanced form. To be sure, absent pre-
cise quantification of both costs and benefits, that argument 
necessarily has a provisional aspect. I have no proof that the 
policy’s costs exceed its benefits. Nevertheless, I view the 
weakness of benefit-related evidence and the accumulation of 
cost-related evidence as sufficiently clear to suggest that a 
working account of the distinctive moral wrong of SQF is feasi-
ble. 
The core of the case against SQF is dynamic and ecological 
in character. It rests on the policy’s effect not just on the specif-
ic persons stopped by police on the street, but on the dynamic 
role that SQF plays in the social and racial stratifications that 
concatenate with each other to create urban residential segre-
gation. It is an analysis, moreover, that proceeds without mak-
ing any assumption of racial animus or individual officer fault. 
In the early 1990s, SQF was adopted as a response to ris-
ing violent crime associated with minority-dominated neigh-
borhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. In that re-
spect, it was at its origin a response to an unexpected 
externality from the urban residential segregation that had 
been promoted by state actors from World War II onward.  
 
 207. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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Local and state officials might have taken another path.208 
From the 1960s onwards, historian Elizabeth Hinton has 
demonstrated, national and local politics gradually “blended 
opportunity, development, and training programs of the War on 
Poverty with the surveillance, patrol, and detention programs 
of the War on Crime.”209 By the 1980s, however, the War on 
Crime “would eventually completely supplant” Great Society 
antipoverty programs as a solution to urban discontent.210 Non-
coercive solutions, in short, had already been tabled by the time 
the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s was in full 
flush.211  
Nevertheless, the policy response to that crime-wave has 
had ironically limited crime-control-related payoff, while at the 
same time ratifying racial stereotypes, emasculating minority 
communities politically, and exacerbating their social and polit-
ical weaknesses. Especially given the backdrop of municipal 
policies that consciously enabled and entrenched the urban 
ghetto, this policy choice was a morally problematic one. It was, 
in effect, a choice by the state to exacerbate a form of racial 
stratification for which the state itself bears large moral (if not 
constitutional) responsibility. 
SQF is thus but one link in a larger “process”212 of social 
and racial stratification in ways that extend well beyond the 
discrete effects of an isolated encounter between one officer and 
one resident.213 Given its exiguous benefits (shared across the 
 
 208. Accord RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 161 (1997) 
(arguing that greater expenditures on police is always an alternative to racial 
profiling). 
 209. Elizabeth Hinton, ‘A War Within Our Boundaries’: Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 101 
(2015). 
 210. Id. at 111. Indeed, the larger a city’s black population, the more it 
spent on policing through the 1970s. Pamela Irving Jackson & Leo Carroll, 
Race and the War on Crime: The Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Po-
lice Expenditures in 90 Non-Southern U.S. Cities, 46 AM. SOC. J. 290, 302–03 
(1981) (finding that a city’s black population was a “significant predictor of ex-
penditures for police salaries and operations”). 
 211. Cf. DUNEIER, supra note 162 (noting that African-American “ghettos,” 
as he calls them, are still characterized by a policy of “withholding resources 
and opportunities for poor blacks”). 
 212. Pager & Shepherd, supra note 160, at 182 (“Beyond more conventional 
forms of individual racism, institutional processes . . . are important to consid-
er.”). 
 213. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color 
Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 77, 82 (2000) (“[S]ocial stratification is constituted through features of 
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whole of society) and its multifarious costs (largely concentrat-
ed within already-impoverished minority communities), it is 
hard to imagine that SQF would have anything but regressive 
distributive effects as between racial groups.214  
On the assumption that my judgments about the relative 
magnitude of costs and benefits are sustained, therefore, I be-
lieve that SQF can fairly be characterized as “a systemic and 
institutional phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and 
the presumption of black and brown criminality.”215 It is one of 
the mechanisms by which racial division in American society is 
produced and reproduced.  
Given this characterization, I resist claims that the prob-
lem of race in policing is a distraction, and that it would be bet-
ter to focus reforming energies on (say) the problem of mass in-
carceration216 or structural inequality.217 SQF—even absent any 
racial animus—cannot be separated from larger processes of 
subordination along social and racial lines, and efforts to dis-
tinguish the two phenomena are deeply misguided.  
Equally beside the point are claims that SQF is based on 
an accurate generalization about racial minorities’ criminali-
ty.218 Such background regularities are themselves functions of 
state action given the state’s role in perpetuating racialized 
concentrated poverty, which is in turn correlated with crime. A 
policy choice that reinforces rather than dissipates the force of 
 
(1) social structure (institutions or practices) and (2) social meaning (stories or 
reasons).”). 
 214. See ZIMRING, supra note 118, at 149 (“[A]ggressiveness in policing is a 
costly strategy because it imposes real disadvantages on exactly the minority 
poor who can least afford additional handicaps.”). 
 215. Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Inno-
cence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 L. & 
SOC. REV. 695, 701 (2010). 
 216. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug 
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594–98 (2003) (“[T]he social harms of incarceration 
. . . are likely to be underappreciated in the racial profiling debate.”). 
 217. In a much-noted analysis, Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser pos-
it a form of profiling that has large crime-control gains, and then argue that 
“much of the harm ostensibly done by profiling” should be ascribed to “system-
atic racism rather than the acts of profiling.” Mathias Risse & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131, 145 (2004). My argu-
ment here is aimed at showing this claim of separation, however plausible in 
their hypothesized framework, does not hold in the world, and that the bene-
fits of eliminating SQF would not (as they put it) be “comparatively modest.” 
Id. at 149. Similarly, it is not the case that “African American communities . . . 
incur short-term costs while benefiting in the long run” from SQF. Id. at 163. 
 218. See sources cited supra note 83. 
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that pernicious generalization is hardly entitled to deference 
based on its putative accuracy.219 
A legal remedy might not be able to capture all of the di-
verse causal pathways I have identified here. But a legal reme-
dy should nonetheless respond in part to SQF’s distinctive 
moral wrong by identifying those instances of policing choice 
that have the least positive effect on security with the largest 
stratification-related spillovers. It is this question of the apti-
tude of constitutional doctrine and its subconstitutional coun-
terpart in disparate-impact law to which I now turn. 
II.  STREET POLICING AND THE LIMITS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE   
This Part turns to the core doctrines of constitutional law 
invoked and applied in challenges to SQF—the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine associated with Terry and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause rules that have coalesced around Feeney. I argue 
that there is a mismatch between these doctrinal vehicles and 
the core normative challenge posed by SQF as I have articulat-
ed it in Part I. This mismatch renders current constitutional 
law ill-suited to accounting for the normative challenges of 
SQF.  
Thinking about the costs and benefits of SQF in terms of 
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection law instead reveals a 
troublingly asymmetrical gap cutting across both doctrinal 
structures. To wit, Fourth Amendment law and Equal Protec-
tion law alike employ narrow transactional frames to tally the 
costs imposed by state action to traditionally subordinate mi-
norities, but are periodically open to dynamic and ecological ef-
fects in ways that serve to obscure or exculpate harms to racial 
minorities. 
To see the mismatch between current constitutional doc-
trine and SQF programs in a nutshell, consider a simple hypo-
thetical. Imagine a police force in which every officer had inter-
nalized both Terry and Feeney. Each officer, in consequence, 
understood that she could not make a nonconsensual street 
stop without the relevant reasonable articulable suspicion of 
criminality, and that she could not make that stop “‘because of,’ 
 
 219. Even our impoverished Equal Protection doctrine, see infra Part II, 
does not overtly treat accuracy as a sufficient justification for the use of racial 
classifications. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. 
REV. 99, 119. 
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not merely ‘in spite of ’”220 the perceived racial identity of the in-
dividual to be stopped. What would change in the actual prac-
tice of SQF? Would the concerns about the volume and racial 
disparities in stops be assuaged?  
The short answer is probably not. Consistent with the 
weak Terry rule, it may well be possible for a police force to 
conduct a very large volume of stops. Consistent with Feeney, 
those stops might be constitutionally valid even if they were 
distributed in a way that deepens racial stratification. Indeed, 
racial disparities are particularly likely to persist if police sin-
cerely believe that African Americans commit a disproportion-
ate share of offenses and thus ought to comprise a higher per-
capita rate of street stops. The application of conventional con-
stitutional doctrine under the Fourth Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause, therefore, is consistent with preserva-
tion of SQF at its present volume and as characterized by cur-
rent racial disparities. 
This Part first considers the Fourth Amendment law, and 
shows its inadequacies. It then analyzes Equal Protection doc-
trine to reveal why it has utterly failed to address the problem 
of street policing. 
A. THE LIMITS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment law of street stops cannot impose 
a meaningful constraint upon SQF in minority neighborhoods 
characterized by concentrated poverty. To the contrary, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine systematically lowers the cost of such 
stops in comparison to others conducted outside the distinctive 
urban ecologies of SQF. To the extent that the Fourth Amend-
ment law of street policing takes account of changing social and 
institutional contexts, though, it is thoroughly asymmetrically. 
It accounts for such contexts only when doing so expands state 
authority.  
The “reasonable articulable suspicion” predicates for a Ter-
ry stop and a related frisk are not demanding hurdles. They fo-
cus solely on the ex-ante evidentiary basis for a stop, and whol-
ly ignore the manner in which a stop is conducted. Terry, that 
is, takes no account of variance in the potential dignitary and 
demoralization externalities imposed by aggressive or demean-
ing police behavior. Moreover, the Court has not defined “rea-
sonable articulable suspicion” beyond warning that an officer 
 
 220. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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must be able to articulate something more than a “hunch[].”221 
The Court has instead underscored that this evaluation be 
made under the “totality of the circumstances.”222 This gives of-
ficers a wide array of predicate facts to choose from when mak-
ing their case. With one exception, officers’ subjective beliefs 
and knowledge are as a result available as bases for a Terry 
stop,223 even though such subjective factors are not relevant to 
the Fourth Amendment analysis in other contexts.224 The excep-
tion is also telling: even where race is the real (i.e., subjective) 
basis of the stop, the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy 
where alternative factual grounds for reasonable articulable 
suspicion can be conjured.225 
Quite apart from this peculiar gerrymandering of the legal-
ly relevant grounds for evaluating the quality of a stop, officers’ 
discretion is rarely in practice subject to rigorous adversarial 
testing in a subsequent criminal adjudication. Where the sole 
witnesses to a stop are the suspect and arresting officers, there 
is little reason to think the resulting testimonial contest will 
result in accurate outcomes. Police have a strong incentive to 
color the facts in their favor, or even outright lie.226 A recent 
ethnographic account of the Chicago criminal courts, for exam-
ple, paints a bleak picture of judges who routinely “laughed at 
the fabrication of police reports as if it were a novelty, rather 
than an abuse of power.”227  
 
 221. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that reasonable articulable suspicion 
is considerably lower than the preponderance of evidence standard). 
 222. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
 223. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspi-
cion are the agent’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity 
and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.”). 
 224. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Our cases have repeated-
ly rejected a subjective approach, asking only whether the circumstances, 
viewed objectively, justify the action.” (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398 (2006)). 
 225. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these 
cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic 
stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”). 
 226. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do 
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996). 
 227. Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleave, Chicago’s Racist Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 15, 2016, at A27; see also NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEAVE, CROOK COUN-
TY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 146–53 
(2016) (discussing perjury and abuse by police). 
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Chicago’s pathologies might be extreme, but it is hard to 
imagine such practices are wholly absent from other large met-
ropolitan court systems.228 In many urban jurisdictions, there-
fore, there will be little effectual incentive for officers to comply 
with Terry’s meager epistemic exhortation. 
Nevertheless, the general trend in judicial reworkings of 
Terry has been deflationary. I will just give one example, as it 
happens one that is particularly relevant to SQF. Whereas the 
Terry Court allowed the stop and frisk only when an officer 
suspected crime was “afoot,”229 subsequent cases extended that 
power to instances in which a crime has been completed.230  
While at first blush it might seem innocuous and sensible, 
this subtle shift in practice dramatically expands police discre-
tion. Under Terry, the constellation of facts that might be in-
voked to justify a stop was bounded by what an officer could ob-
serve at a specific moment in time.231 Now, an officer can rely 
on a far greater universe of historical facts, available through a 
police forces’ index of suspect descriptions, to support reasona-
ble articulable suspicion.  
In a handful of controversial cases, descriptions identifying 
African-American suspects have been employed to conduct 
blanket searches.232 In the controversial case of Brown v. City of 
Oneonta, for example, a description of a black male suspect 
provoked Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non-
 
 228. See, e.g., William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York, Abuses of 
Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1 (documenting racial and 
sexual bigotry in New York State courts).  
 229. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (“Based upon that whole picture the detaining of-
ficers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the partic-
ular person stopped of criminal activity.”). In some instances, the Court has 
used language that suggests a resistance to settling on a specific quantum of 
suspicion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While ‘rea-
sonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and re-
quires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the 
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification 
for making the stop.”). 
 230. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). 
 231. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33. 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63 
(1976) (determining that secondary of inspection of motorists do not violate the 
Constitution even if referrals are made largely on the basis of Mexican ances-
try); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Yet our role 
is not to evaluate whether the police action in question was the appropriate 
response under the circumstances, but to determine whether what was done 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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white persons,” including women, encountered on the streets.233 
Even absent the broad search at issue in Brown, a large enough 
pool of suspect descriptions (as is likely to be the case in large 
cities) means that police discretion to stop becomes orders of 
magnitude larger than the authority defined in Terry.234 
Subsequent refinements to the Terry regime have rendered 
SQF more attractive relative to other ways of deploying polic-
ing resources. As the late William Stuntz noted, criminal pro-
cedure rules can act as “subsidies . . . making some kinds of . . . 
law enforcement . . . cheaper” than others.235 Stuntz applied 
this logic to make a comparison between “policing street mar-
kets,” which is “cheap,” for the police, and the more expensive 
regulation of indoor, upscale drug markets.236 His point, though, 
can be extended to the neighborhood level. 
For a parallel differential arises between neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty and areas of comparative wealth because 
of two Fourth Amendment precedents. First, the Court in Illi-
nois v. Wardlow held that a suspect’s mere presence in a “high 
crime area,” and more particularly “an area of heavy narcotics 
trafficking” was “relevant” to the legality of a Terry stop.237 Evi-
dence from New York’s SQF practice also demonstrates that 
this term is “vulnerable to subjective and highly contextualized 
interpretation.”238  
This may be of particular concern to the extent that an in-
creasing proportion of minorities tends to create a belief of dis-
 
 233. 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc); see also Bela August Walker, The Color of Crime: The 
Case Against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 673–
74 (2003) (describing other cases of blanket searches for black suspects, and 
noting the absence of even anecdotal evidence of the same happening for white 
suspects). 
 234. Further discretion arises when police use predictive algorithms, such 
as PredPol, to forecast crime patterns. See Erica Goode, Sending the Police Be-
fore There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/16/us/16police.html. 
 235. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (2006). 
 236. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 
1821 (1998). 
 237. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 238. Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 79; see also Andrew Guthrie Fergu-
son & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifia-
ble and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion 
Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2008) (“[W]hat is termed a ‘high-crime 
area’ can differ from case to case, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”). 
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orderliness and criminality, as multiple studies show,239 
Wardlow creates an incentive to target minority neighborhoods. 
Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a “high crime 
area” is to be identified or bounded, Wardlow explicitly subsi-
dizes police activity in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty 
in comparison to wealthy neighborhoods.240 
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v. 
Streiff 241 creates an incentive for officers to target for stops 
populations that are likely to have a higher per capita rate of 
bench warrants. In Streiff, the arresting officer was conducting 
a stakeout of a house where drug sales were suspected to hap-
pen.242 He saw Strieff leave the house and stopped him, despite 
lacking the Terry predicate of reasonable articulable suspi-
cion.243 As a result of what the state conceded to be an illegal 
stop, the officer asked Streiff for identification.244 Upon check-
ing the produced documentation with his dispatcher, the officer 
learned of an outstanding warrant for Streiff and arrested 
him.245 A search incident to arrest found methamphetamine and 
drug paraphernalia.246  
The issue before the Court was whether this evidence 
should be excluded as fruit of the initial illegal stop.247 Writing 
for five Justices, Justice Thomas said no.248 Characterizing the 
initial unlawful stop as “negligent” and a “good-faith” mis-
take,249 the Court found the search-incident-to-arrest that had 
produced the narcotics to be “sufficiently attenuated by the pre-
existing arrest warrant.”250 Hence, the evidence found during 
the search incident to arrest was not subject to exclusion in 
Streiff ’s criminal adjudication.251 
As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, “Outstanding 
warrants are surprisingly common.”252 A recent ethnography of 
 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 194–95. 
 240. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 241. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
 242. Id. at 2059. 
 243. Id. at 2060. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 2064. 
 249. Id. at 2063. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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misdemeanor courts in New York illustrates how courts and 
prosecutors generate a large volume of outstanding warrants 
for failures to appear at repeatedly rescheduled hearings, and 
then seek dispositions with little effect other than to facilitate 
later arrests.253  
In Streiff, Justice Sotomayor did not contextualize the use 
of outstanding warrants in the SQF context. But she cited evi-
dence gathered by the Justice Department in Ferguson, Mis-
souri, and explained that the “astounding numbers of warrants 
can be used by police to stop people without cause,” and flagged 
that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate vic-
tims of this type of scrutiny.”254 Justice Sotomayor’s analysis is 
hard to dispute. Police, indeed, have long been cognizant of the 
strategic potential for outstanding-warrant checks during 
street stops and have strategically exploited it.255 
The decision in Streiff creates a new incentive for police to 
engage in “negligent” stops,256 lacking even with the minimal 
accouterments of reasonable articulable suspicion, in order to 
check for warrants. This incentive becomes more powerful as 
the expected number of such outstanding warrants in a neigh-
borhood increases.257 Here then is yet another incentive press-
ing police to focus street patrols on neighborhoods of concen-
trated poverty: even if they cannot muster the minimal 
evidentiary predicate of Terry, officers have a sure-fire way of 
showing “progress,” simply by making illegal stops and arrest-
ing based on either outstanding warrants or contraband found 
during a search incident to arrest. Streiff allows officers to em-
 
 253. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 659 (2014). 
 254. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 255. The link between Terry stops and outstanding warrants is not a new 
one. In the late 1990s, New York police realized that quality-of-life stops could 
be leveraged into frequent arrests that removed many from the streets. See 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influ-
ence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 341 n.210 (1998) 
(describing Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s endorsement of this tactic in 1998). 
 256. Equally, Strieff is an incentive for police departments to fail to train 
adequately their officers on the factual predicates of a Terry stop. See general-
ly Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (“Officer Fackrell was at most negligent.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Police May Use Evidence 
Found After Illegal Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/06/21/us/supreme-court-says-police-may-use-evidence-found-after 
-illegal-stops.html (noting reports cited in the dissent of Justice Sotomayor 
that claimed that there are outstanding warrants out on 16,000 of 21,000 resi-
dents in Ferguson, Missouri). 
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ploy stops even absent Terry suspicion and demonstrate “suc-
cess.” 
Decisions such as Wardlow and Streiff mean that current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence systematically tilts in favor 
of SQF. The doctrinal framework at work in these cases mini-
mizes both proximate and distant harms to individuals 
stopped. It also ignores the ecological harms and dynamic strat-
ification effects associated with SQF.258 Indeed, it seems fair to 
say that the vocabulary of the Fourth Amendment does not at 
present contain the resources even to account for those harms, 
let alone hold them in the balance with Terry stops’ positive, 
crime-control effects.  
One indication of this is that Justice Sotomayor’s com-
ments about the ecological context of street policing were so 
strikingly at odds with the normative verbiage of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment cases that they generated national media 
attention.259 If the mere fact a Justice is cognizant of the larger 
policy context in which a legal question arises stimulates the 
press into action, it is because the modal Fourth Amendment 
decision is hermetically detached from the distinctive ecological 
and dynamic costs flowing from urban policing. 
Nevertheless, that jurisprudence is not wholly bounded by 
a narrow, transactional focus. Rather, the Court selectively and 
asymmetrically accounts for dynamic effects. Consider the 
Streiff Court’s treatment of the exclusionary remedy.260 The 
Court’s foundational decisions about the scope of that remedy 
focus on its effects on officers’ incentives.261 The Court has re-
peatedly stressed that it is willing to allow the costly exclusion-
ary remedy only when its downstream incentive effects in rela-
tion to police compliance with the Fourth Amendment are 
substantial.262 Notionally acknowledging this point, the Streiff 
 
 258. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
761, 779 (2012) (“[A]nyone who has experienced a Terry stop, however, knows 
that the harm to dignity can be substantial. And anyone who has been frisked 
knows that the invasion affects bodily integrity far more than privacy.”). 
 259. See Adam Liptak, In Dissents, Sonia Sotomayor Takes on the Criminal 
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/ 
05/us/politics/in-dissents-sonia-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-justice 
-system.html. 
 260. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. 
 261. Id. at 2073–74 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 262. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (“Judges and 
magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial 
officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. 
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Court stated that only “purposeful or flagrant” police miscon-
duct needed to be deterred by exclusion.263  
But why this would be so is not clear. Tort liability for neg-
ligence, for example, can easily be premised on a deterrence 
theory.264 In Streiff itself, the Court gave no thought to the pos-
sibility that its rule might elicit less care by officers in their use 
of Terry stops—let alone a differential impact in neighborhoods 
characterized by high rates of outstanding or bench warrants. 
Streiff suggests that the Court is willing to think about the 
dynamic effects of the exclusionary rule on incentives when do-
ing so narrows Fourth Amendment remedies, but it is not will-
ing to entertain a dynamic analysis when doing so would ex-
pand those remedies.265 In other cases, the Justices have 
similarly been willing to account for increases in police profes-
sionalism.266 Yet judicial decisions on the exclusionary rule sys-
tematically ignore potential institutional problems of police 
perjury and abusive conduct.267 
There is, in short, little reason to expect that the Court’s 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine will provide a vehicle for 
capturing the distinctive wrong of SQF. Indeed to the extent it 
nudges police conduct of urban street policing in one way or an-
other, the Court has abetted the core wrong of SQF more than 
it has ameliorated it. For this reason, it seems wise to also ana-
lyze SQF in terms of its racial impact—a topic addressed at 
length below and in Part III. 
 
The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”); 
see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 548–49 (2012) (reiterating 
Leon’s deterrence-based logic); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 
(2011) (same). 
 263. 136 S. Ct. at 2063. 
 264. Id. at 2072–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 265. In a similar vein, David Sklansky has pointed out that the Court tog-
gles without any principled basis between rules and standards in Fourth 
Amendment case-law in ways that inure to the government’s benefit. See Da-
vid A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 294–98. 
 266. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another develop-
ment over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the in-
creasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal 
police discipline.”). 
 267. For a discussion of how these problems arise, and why common state 
and local rules exacerbate them, see Aziz Z. Huq & Richard McAdams, Litigat-
ing the Blue Wall of Silence: How To Challenge the Police Privilege To Delay 
Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 213–26. 
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B. THE LIMITS OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s decisions on race and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause provide no better traction on the distinctive 
wrong of SQF. To the contrary, thinking about racial equality 
doctrine through the lens of SQF illuminates a gap between the 
Court’s articulated justifications and its current doctrinal speci-
fications. To take seriously the normative concerns I have 
flagged would mean treating SQF as a paradigmatic Equal Pro-
tection violation. Today, however, the doctrine relegates polic-
ing disparities to the margin. 
Two core prohibitions are embodied in current Equal Pro-
tection Clause jurisprudence. First, explicit racial classifica-
tions trigger strict scrutiny, and require government to 
“demonstrate with clarity” that its “purpose or interest is both 
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of 
the classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its 
purpose.”268  
In the absence of an explicit racial classification,269 a gov-
ernment action motivated by a “discriminatory purpose” with 
an adverse effect on a discrete protected class establishes an 
Equal Protection Clause violation. But the Court’s gloss on dis-
criminatory purpose, promulgated in Personnel Administrator 
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, is cast in exacting terms.270 It com-
pels litigants to show that a state actor “selected or reaffirmed 
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”271 In contrast, a disparate impact on a racial group 
alone does nothing to impugn the constitutionality of a state ac-
tion.272 
 
 268. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013)). 
 269. This is a bit imprecise. “Often, courts do not approach the question 
whether a statute uses express racial classifications on formal grounds at all. 
Instead, the grounds of decision are normative.” See Primus, supra note 41, at 
509. 
 270. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 271. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted). The same standard applies 
to both religious and racial discrimination. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
677 (2009). 
 272. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264–65 (1977) (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.” (citing Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976))).  
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In the criminal justice context, this doctrinal framework 
leaves the state with a largely free hand. At the Supreme 
Court, few Equal Protection cases have arisen in the criminal 
justice context concerning systemic or structural inequalities, 
as opposed to discrete instances of bias on the part of individual 
actors such as jurors or (more rarely) prosecutors.  
Only one recent case has grappled with an explicit racial 
classification. In Johnson v. California, a state prison used a 
racial classification to sort inmates temporarily before cell as-
signments could be determined.273 The Court rejected the state’s 
call to derogate from strict scrutiny.274 In contrast, the Court 
declined to grant certiorari in Brown v. City of Oneonta, a case 
that would have required it to consider whether the Second 
Circuit had correctly held that a race-based suspect description 
was not a “racial classification” subject to strict scrutiny.275 
Under Feeney, there are a handful of cases in which prose-
cutorial use of preemptory challenges is held to be racially mo-
tivated, and thus to violate the Equal Protection Clause.276 But 
more systemic challenges to the operation of the criminal jus-
tice institutions have been wholly absent from the Court’s 
docket since the 1987 case of McClesky v. Kemp.277 In large 
measure, this is because McCleskey established a near-
insurmountable barrier to such challenges.278 In that capital 
 
 273. 543 U.S. 499, 502–03 (2005) (describing prison policy). 
 274. Id. at 505 (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . 
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 275. 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 235 F.3d 769 (2000). 
 276. Such cases are rare, but not unknown. In the 2015 Supreme Court 
Term, for example, the Court found that the Georgia Supreme Court had 
made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it declined to find that prosecution 
use of preemptory strikes in a capital case was not animated by a discrimina-
tory purpose. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016). This is an 
extremely rare ruling, and is explained by the graphic evidence of naked racial 
reasoning (inadvertently) discovered by the defendant. Id. at 1744. This is not 
the only instance, though, in which a finding of discriminatory purpose in the 
use of preemptory challenges has led to a conviction being vacated. See, e.g., 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). 
 277. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 278. McCleskey was quickly pilloried, and has been much criticized since. 
See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, 
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (“Professor 
Bedau does not exaggerate when he compares McCleskey to Plessy and 
Korematsu.”). Even Justice Powell, who provided a fifth vote in the case, ex-
pressed regret for that vote. David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand 
on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at A1. It is not without interest 
that another case in which Justice Powell cast the deciding vote, and later ex-
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case, the Court declined to infer discriminatory purpose from 
unrebutted statistical evidence that Georgia’s capital punish-
ment treated defendants differently based on their race and the 
race of their victim.279 Among the reasons the Court offered for 
declining to entertain even powerful statistical evidence,280 it 
worried that “if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias 
has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we 
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty,” including noncapital sentencing.281 This concern about 
what Justice Brennan acerbically characterized as “a fear of too 
much justice”282 reoccurs in other instances in which criminal 
justice disparities have been challenged.283 
Absent the miraculous happenstance of testimonial or doc-
umentary evidence of bias—a stroke of luck that befell plain-
tiffs in the challenge to New York’s SQF policy284—McCleskey 
 
pressed regret, has since been overruled. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says 
He May Have Been Wrong, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3 (noting Powell’s re-
gret at having cast a deciding vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), which was overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 279. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–87. The race-of-the-defendant effect iden-
tified in the Baldus study, however, was relatively small in comparison to 
race-of-the-victim effects. Id. 
 280. Although McCleskey has been much criticized, it is still worth reiterat-
ing here that many of its reasons for rejecting statistical evidence are plainly 
spurious. For example, the Court asserted that an unlawful purpose might 
more safely be inferred if there were “fewer entities” and “fewer variables.” Id. 
at 294–95. But the confidence generated by regression increases with size—it 
does not decrease. And the more alternative explanations for variance exist, 
the more plausible defenses the state has. Further, the Court stated that “dis-
cretion is essential to the criminal justice process; we would demand excep-
tionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.” 
Id. at 297. This is hard to understand; in the absence of discretion, there 
would be no opportunity for a state actor to take a decision motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose. To insulate discretionary decisions from review for such 
invalid purposes is to say in effect that there is no discriminatory-purpose lia-
bility in the criminal law. 
 281. Id. at 315, n.38. 
 282. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next states that its 
unwillingness to regard petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on 
the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would open the door to wide-
spread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing . . . [S]uch a statement 
seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 376 (1996) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (noting “the potentially radical implications” of inferences from statisti-
cal evidence of racial disparities in the criminal-justice context). 
 284. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (quoting the highest ranking uniformed officer of the New York Police 
Department as mandating stops of young black and Hispanic youth between 
the ages of fourteen and twenty). 
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means that the courthouse door is effectively shut to discrimi-
natory-purpose challenges in the criminal justice context.285 
McCleskey, in tandem with the narrow definition of “racial 
classifications” evinced by the Court’s treatment of Johnson 
and Brown, drastically narrows litigants’ opportunities to chal-
lenge the role of race in criminal justice institutions.  
The substance of current Equal Protection doctrine, in 
short, evinces no concern for either the ecological spillovers of 
enforcement actions onto larger racial cohorts. And much like 
the Fourth Amendment cases canvassed above, it is heedless of 
dynamic effects—except perhaps for its evident concern with 
maintaining the criminal-justice status quo. Finally, neither 
the rule against racial classification nor the bar to discrimina-
tory motivations takes into account the possibility that officials 
are aware that a policy pursued for nonracial ends has a wholly 
foreseeable negative effects on other members of a racial or 
ethnic cohort,286 or the possibility that race is so pervasively 
correlated with nonracial traits—such as residence, socioeco-
nomic status, and the like—that official decision-makers simply 
cannot disentangle racial from nonracial criteria.287 
There is something of a puzzle here. In glossing the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court has invoked ideas of racial stig-
ma,288 racial balkanization,289 and the dignitary interest in be-
ing judged on one’s own merits.290 And then it has been largely 
silent about policing.  
 
 285. The Court has also limited discovery respecting evidence of racial bias 
in the prosecutorial context to instances in which a defendant can already 
point to clear evidence of bias. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
470 (1996). Armstrong’s somewhat circular standard has been roundly criti-
cized. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discov-
ering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (con-
tending that standard established by the Court in Armstrong is nearly 
impossible for many defendants with meritorious claims to satisfy). 
 286. See Siegel, supra note 43, at 47 (drawing parallel between Feeney and 
the doctrine of double effect). 
 287. See Strauss, supra note 219, at 114–15 (discussing the cognitive con-
sequences of such pervasive correlations). 
 288. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they 
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of 
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (expressing concern that the use of racial classifica-
tions will exacerbate racial hostility and conflict and will effectively divide the 
nation into segments based on race).  
 290. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the prin-
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But it is not hard to see that SQF, as described in Part I, 
implicates each of these concerns. It is, most importantly, often 
expressly predicated on a putative relationship between race to 
criminality.291 It is indeed explicitly defended on the basis of a 
generalization—a stereotype about racial minorities that is not 
merely derogatory, but that has historically been a keystone of 
discriminatory legal architectures. And its advocates make no 
bones that the price of public safety will be borne dispropor-
tionately by only some, and only because of the color of their 
skin.  
Further, it not only thrives upon the festering racial segre-
gation that scars our cities, but it reinforces segregation to the 
extent that minorities are subject to increased stops when they 
leave their neighborhoods. Quite literally, it echoes and embeds 
the balkanization of our cities into black and white quarters.  
In addition, thanks to the weak evidentiary threshold of 
Terry, it enables police to engage in aggregate deprivations of 
individual liberty that are predicated only fractionally on indi-
vidual behavior and largely on race and place. If one takes the 
Court’s justifications on face value, policing tactics such as 
SQF, in short, ought to be the sine qua non of what the Equal 
Protection Clause prevents. 
The Equal Protection doctrine, in conclusion, provides the 
moral justifications but not the doctrinal tools for dealing with 
SQF. It is beholden to the default narrow and atomistic trans-
actional frame of constitutional doctrine, which shears away 
both ecological and dynamic contexts. And ultimately, it lacks 
the courage of its notional convictions. For these reasons, it is 
not well adapted to the task of fixing SQF. 
III.  THE DISPARATE-IMPACT LENS ON SQF   
This Part turns from critique to a more constructive pro-
posal. Not all instruments to mitigate moral wrongs have to re-
side in the Constitution. So I look elsewhere.  
I argue that a disparate-impact framework of liability, now 
found in both federal statutes and state law, provides a bet-
 
cipal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the 
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her 
own merit and essential qualities.”). 
 291. See supra sources cited in note 83 (quoting, inter alia, New York Po-
lice Commission Ray Kelly to the effect that it makes sense to stop minorities 
because minorities tend to commit crime). 
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ter—but not a perfect—framework for analyzing urban street-
policing policy.  
The purpose of the disparate-impact lens advanced here is 
diagnostic. It is also second best in the sense that it does not 
track the loose cost-benefit analysis that is fleshed out in Part 
I: that cost-benefit analysis, in my view, impugns all program-
matic use of SQF in racially diverse cities at present. More 
modestly, a disparate-impact lens provides a way to identify 
when a police department’s programmatic use of Terry stops is 
especially likely to be unjustified because it is characterized by 
distinctive ecological and dynamic harms. A disparate-impact 
lens, in other words, flushes out the subset of municipal polic-
ing practices from which the harms identified in Part I are 
most likely to flow. It does not flag every instance in which SQF 
is unjustified on welfarist terms.  
Formally, a disparate-impact framework identifies a set of 
policing practices in which the likely proximate costs of SQF 
are concentrated on minority communities without an ade-
quately supported justification. The analysis developed in Part 
II suggested that the proximate costs of SQF—which include 
the hassle and humiliation of stops—are only a fraction of the 
total costs of SQF. The latter comprise the larger set of dynam-
ic costs to individuals, families and communities.  
But if even the proximate costs of SQF are highly concen-
trated, it is likely that aggregate costs are also extremely con-
centrated. Where the state cannot identify a strong public poli-
cy justification for that concentration, SQF should be ranked as 
legally problematic. More specifically, where the state cannot 
adequately make the case that the concentration of SQF re-
sponds to a real crime problem, and in fact mitigates that prob-
lem, it should be required to reconsider its policing strategy.  
In this sense, the avoidance of disparate impact is a mod-
est, second-best demand, which nudges the state’s attention 
toward the right elements of policing strategy.292 It invites, that 
is, remedial attention to systemic, rather than individualistic, 
pathologies. And it avoids the moralizing, and potentially polar-
izing, language of individual blame and liability. 
To flesh out this alternative lens onto SQF, this Part de-
fines and defends disparate-impact liability as a legally availa-
ble approach for analyzing policing decisions. In particular, I 
 
 292. As such it might be applied more generally to policing tactics, includ-
ing hot-spot policing. 
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develop the reasons for which disparate impact is superior to 
the currently dominant constitutional approaches described in 
Part II. Having dealt with potential objections to its translation 
to the policing context, I conclude by sketching how in practice 
disparate-impact liability can be applied to SQF.  
In practice, a disparate-impact analysis requires economet-
ric studies of the aggregate data about stops, frisks, and other 
outcomes, as well as fine-grained judgments about how to spec-
ify and interpret such studies. I set forth three general lines of 
inquiry that might profitably be applied to such aggregate data 
to determine whether a disparate impact exists; I largely 
bracket, however, more technical questions of econometric spec-
ification. Together, these empirical strategies nevertheless pro-
vide a rough template for making disparate impact an effective 
and practicable instrument of legal reform. 
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
The theory of disparate-impact liability in race discrimina-
tion cases is associated with the Supreme Court’s construction 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.293 In a somewhat chastened form, it remains availa-
ble to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.294 Dispar-
ate impact is also a cognizable theory of liability under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)295 and the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA).296 It can be understood as either an in-
strument for rooting out bad intent, or as a freestanding 
ground of liability.297 Disparate impact is in contrast, a ‘road not 
taken’ in Equal Protection law.298 
Disparate-impact liability in the policing context is availa-
ble under two sets of laws. First, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits “discrimination under any program or activi-
 
 293. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 294. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009) (requiring “a strong 
basis in evidence” to shield employer actions “to avoid violating the disparate-
impact provision” from disparate treatment liability under Title VII). 
 295. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1998)). 
 296. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a) (1988) 
to permit disparate-impact liability). 
 297. Primus, supra note 41, at 520–24 (exploring both accounts). 
 298. See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 
1131–35 (1997) (describing rejection of disparate impact). 
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ty” receiving federal funds.299 Pursuant to an explicit grant of 
rule-making authority under the statute, federal agencies, in-
cluding the Department of Justice, have promulgated regula-
tions prohibiting disparate racial impacts as well as disparate 
racial treatment.300 The Justice Department’s disparate-impact 
regulation applies to “any program for which Federal financial 
assistance is authorized under a law administered by the De-
partment.”301 Because local police departments receive federal 
funding from “dozens” of separate programs, many adminis-
tered by the Department of Justice,302 the Title VI bar on dis-
parate impact applies to most state and local police forces. That 
prohibition, however, may be enforced by public suits but not 
via individuals invoking a private right of action.303 The New 
Orleans consent decree and the Baltimore settlement obtained 
by the Justice Department, for example, both invoke Title VI 
authority, albeit in nebulous terms.304 
Second, at least two states prohibit policing measures with 
disparate racial impacts. The Illinois Civil Rights Act, tracking 
Title VI’s language and effect, prohibits “discrimination under 
any program or activity on the grounds of that person’s race, 
color, national origin, or gender.”305 In at least one case, it has 
been applied to policing decisions.306 California’s law, which ap-
plies to all state programs, prohibits “criteria or methods of 
administration that . . . have the purpose or effect of subjecting 
 
 299. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1973). 
 300. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013) (Dept. of Justice); 49 C.F.R. 
§ 21.5(b)(2) (2012) (Dept. of Transp.); Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to 
be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120, 100.130, 100.500). 
 301. 28 C.F.R. § 42.103 (2012). 
 302. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2015). 
 303. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Prior to Sandoval, private 
plaintiffs challenged racially disparate policing using Title VI in Maryland 
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Department of State Police, 
72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999). 
 304. New Orleans Decree, supra note 21, at 2; BALTIMORE AGREEMENT, 
supra note 23, at 1. 
 305. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/5 (West 2012); see also Jackson v. 
Cerpa, 696 F. Supp. 2d 962, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[ICRA] was expressly in-
tended to provide a state law remedy that was identical to the federal dispar-
ate impact canon.”); accord McFadden v. Bd. of Educ. for Ill. Sch. Dist. U-46, 
984 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 306. For an example of a civil suit based on this provision, see Central Aus-
tin Neighborhood Association v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E. 3d 976, 984 (Ill. Ap. Ct. 
2013) (refusing to dismiss suit on political question grounds). 
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a person to discrimination on the basis of ethnic group identifi-
cation, religion, age, sex, color, or a physical or mental disabil-
ity.”307 
Disparate impact is commonly framed as a three-step 
analysis. In the employment-discrimination context, a prima 
facie case is established by showing that a specific employment 
practice caused racial disparities in a salient outcome meas-
ure.308 A racial disparity is gauged by comparing employment 
rates in an employer’s workforce with the qualified labor pool309 
or the applicant pool,310 rather than to the general population. 
Agencies interpreting Title VII have long used a four-fifth rule 
to single out cognizable disparities.311 The Supreme Court has 
approvingly cited this interpretation, adding that a simple 
“significant statistical disparity, and nothing more” is needed 
at the threshold.312  
This prima facie case, however, may be rebutted by evi-
dence that “the challenged practice is job related for the posi-
tion in question and consistent with business necessity.”313 This 
 
 307. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1154(h)(i) (2017). Subsection c of the same 
provision also makes it unlawful to “provide a person with an aid, benefit or 
service that is not as effective in affording an equal opportunity to obtain the 
same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achieve-
ment as that provided to others. In some situations, identical treatment may 
be discriminatory.” Id. § 1154(c).  
 308. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012) (requiring the identification of “a par-
ticular employment practice that causes a disparate impact”). The causation 
element reflects the Court’s ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, which 
has been abandoned in other respects. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“As a general 
matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or 
particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under 
attack.”). 
 309. See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 1994) (“In a case of 
discrimination in hiring or promoting, the relevant comparison is between the 
percentage of minority employees and the percentage of potential minority ap-
plicants in the qualified labor pool.”); accord Lopez v. Laborers Int’l Union Lo-
cal No. 18, 987 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993); Shidaker v. Tisch, 833 F.2d 
627, 631 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 310. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1982) (comparing ra-
cial composition of those entering the selection process with that of people ul-
timately promoted); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) 
(requiring that plaintiffs “show[] that the tests in question select applicants 
for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the 
pool of applicants” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973))). 
 311. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1978). 
 312. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 313. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1). 
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defense, however, is overcome if there is a legitimate alterna-
tive employment practice that will result in less discrimina-
tion.314 
B. THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
Black-letter constitutional law largely ignores the ecologi-
cal and dynamic aspects of SQF. It therefore fails to provide a 
useful analytic lens for determining when and how urban street 
policing is a moral wrong.  
Why would a disparate-impact lens do any better? It is not 
a form of cost-benefit analysis of the kind developed above, af-
ter all. Rather, a disparate-impact analysis is appropriate here 
because it is a way to isolate the proximate costs of a policy (ex-
cluding, that is, its social, familial, and intergenerational ef-
fects) and to compare those to its affirmative policy justifica-
tions. In the policing context, disparate impact thus weighs a 
subcategory of the costs imposed on minority populations 
against almost all the crime-control related benefits of the poli-
cy. Given its failure to capture the full range of costs adum-
brated in Part II, and given that it will likely account for most 
of the benefits of SQF, a disparate-impact lens is likely to be 
radically under-inclusive: it will only capture a subset of cases 
in which SQF imposes a moral wrong. 
Nevertheless, there are three reasons for thinking that 
disparate impact is a better fit for identifying the distinctive 
moral wrong of SQF identified in Part I even if it does not track 
precisely a cost-benefit analysis.  
First, disparate-impact liability is at least focused on ag-
gregate, rather than individual, outcomes. It is panoramic ra-
ther than microscopic. The institutional focus of disparate im-
pact widens the array of relevant institutional decisions that 
can be considered as causes of harm. Policing is not simply a 
matter of officers on the street, making ad hoc decisions. Like 
any other complex organizations, a police force is channeled 
through policies, practices, and bureaucratic norms developed 
at competing institutional nodes, from city hall to chief of po-
lice’s office to the precinct-house. The capacious lens used by 
disparate impact captures more relevant state actions than an 
approach focused on bad motives. 
Analysis under a wide-angle disparate-impact rubric is al-
so not limited to the consequences of a discrete individual’s ac-
 
 314. Id. 
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tion. It focuses more capaciously on all “the effects of [a] . . . 
practice.”315 SQF, as I have described it in Part I, need not rest 
on pernicious individual motivations to generate a distinctive 
moral wrong. Rather, that wrong can flow from the “effects” of 
institutional policies and practices. Disparate impact is sensi-
tive to a wide range of effects, and is in particular able to cap-
ture the interaction between past distributions and present po-
licing practice. An institutional practice, such as SQF, will 
produce different effects depending on the context to which is 
applied. When employed in a fashion that tracks patterns of ex-
isting racial segregation, its race-related patterns will be dif-
ferent from an application that cuts across extant forms of ra-
cial stratification. This difference is captured in the broad scope 
of disparate-impact analysis, which accounts for history, as 
well as institutional context, in a way that discriminatory 
treatment analysis cannot. 
Second, disparate-impact analysis focuses attention on the 
morally relevant question of whether the crime-control benefits 
of the policy as a whole justify its costs. Once a racial effect is 
identified at the threshold, the second step of the disparate-
impact analysis involves careful consideration of the affirma-
tive justifications for the disparity. In effect, the analysis 
roughly weighs positives against negatives.  
In the discriminatory treatment context, by contrast, there 
is no opportunity to identify or weigh all relevant costs. As a 
result, when a race-based criteria is used, as in Brown v. City of 
Oneonta,316 a Court inclined to permit race-based suspect de-
scriptions as cost-justified will find it easier to avoid strict scru-
tiny by declining to perceive a racial classification at work in 
the first instance.317 On the other side of the ledger, disparate-
impact analysis also considers the aggregate outcomes of a poli-
cy. In the SQF context, for example, this would mean counts of 
the numbers of different racial groups who are stopped.  
Again, it is important to emphasize that this is not a full 
tally of the ecological and dynamic spillovers from aggressive 
 
 315. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) (se-
cond emphasis added). 
 316. 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 317. Indeed, the Brown Court’s argument that no racial classification was 
at work because the suspect description also mentioned gender, as Richard 
Primus explains, simply “cannot be right,” because it implies that “what would 
be a racial classification standing alone is not a racial classification if the ra-
cial criterion is combined with nonracial criteria.” Primus, supra note 41, at 
511. 
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SQF policing. But it accounts for the policy’s sheer size—and 
hence reflects, at least approximately, the effect of a large 
number of minority stops on self-worth, residential patterns, 
and the diffusion of stereotypical beliefs about the links be-
tween race and crime far better than a legal framework 
pinched to fit cleanly around individual motives. 
Finally, disparate-impact liability obviates the need to 
make controversial judgments about individuals’ intentions, be-
liefs, and attitudes. By focusing attention on these elusive psy-
chological facts, both Terry and Feeney invite self-deception and 
perjury on the part of police and municipal policymakers. The 
Feeney framework in particular also ratchets up emotional 
stakes by predicating a remedy on the finding that a specific 
person is motivated by discriminatory intent, a standard that 
has the potential to induce backlash within regulated entities 
such as police forces.318 By honing in upon consequentialist cri-
teria instead, the disparate-impact standard obviates loaded, 
and easily deflected, allegations of bad intent, even as it draws 
salutary attention to the deeper and more enduring costs of 
SQF. 
To be clear, no judicially enforceable theory of liability will 
provide a panacea to the problem of concentrated racialized 
poverty, or the complex network of state action and inaction 
that created and perpetuated it. The case for disparate-impact 
liability in the policing context rests on the more modest claim 
that it captures a wider array of morally relevant costs and 
benefits than the available alternatives. It does not imply per-
fection. 
C. THE OBJECTIONS TO DISPARATE IMPACT IN THE POLICING 
CONTEXT 
Three objections to the application of disparate-impact lia-
bility to the policing context are worth resolving before turning 
to the nitty-gritty of application. They concern its constitution-
ality, its efficacy, and the availability of popular support. 
To begin with, there has recently been a question about the 
constitutionality of disparate-impact liability, even though in 
its infancy in the 1970s it was understood as an important 
 
 318. External control efforts, such as individual blame and liability, tend to 
increase certain forms of racial bias. See Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of 
Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (but Also 
Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472, 1472–75 (2011). 
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strand of Equal Protection law.319 Paradoxically, at least one 
member of the Court has intimated that disparate impact 
might itself violate the Equal Protection Clause because it forc-
es race consciousness.320 Nevertheless, more recent precedent 
suggests that there is “no constitutional problem in the exist-
ence of disparate impact prohibitions,” but that “those prohibi-
tions might raise such problems in their application.”321 In par-
ticular, the Court has suggested that the second step of the 
analysis—the proffer of legitimate justifications for a dispari-
ty—is key. 
In glossing the FHA’s disparate impact prong, the Court in 
its 2015 Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs 
v. Inclusive Communities Project opinion cautioned that consti-
tutional problems would arise if “liability were imposed based 
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.”322 Rather, it is on-
ly “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that legiti-
mately and constitutionally trigger such liability.323 This places 
great stress on the opportunity a defendant must have in a dis-
parate impact proceeding to point to “[non-]arbitrary” and 
“[]necessary” grounds for a justification.324 More specifically, a 
regression analysis used to identify a race effect must include 
controls for legitimate justifications for a disparity.325 
 
 319. Siegel, supra note 43, at 11–13 (noting that in the 1970s, “equal pro-
tection law did not sharply distinguish proof of purpose and proof of impact”). 
 320. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, 
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and 
to make decisions based on (because of ) those racial outcomes. That type of 
racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”). 
 321. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification 
and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1129 (2016). 
 322. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
 323. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 324. An alternative formulation of this concern is that disparate impact 
does not “operate to encourage regulated entities to classify individuals based 
on race.” Bagenstos, supra note 321, at 1130. Whereas in the employment con-
text, the shadow of disparate-impact liability might push employers toward 
the use of quotas, it is hard to see how disparate impact would have this effect 
in the policing context. To the contrary, in the absence of disparate impact, 
SQF is arguably best understood as motivated by implicit quotas. 
 325. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 & n.10 (1986) (requiring 
controls for “major factors”). Lower courts have stressed the need to avoid con-
trols for anything other than a legitimate justification. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 280 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“[S]tatistical evidence does not have to control for every single variable in or-
der to be sufficient.”). 
  
2017] POLICING DISPARATE POLICING 2465 
 
A second concern raised by a number of recent commenta-
tors is that “the disparate impact theory has produced no sub-
stantial social change and there is no reason to think that ex-
tending the theory to other contexts would have produced 
meaningful reform.”326 A common thread uniting these concerns 
is the premise that courts are unwilling to “broadly restructure 
social institutions”327 or interfere with the private intra-firm or-
dering.328 
To be sure, the frailty of the judicial will to enforce consti-
tutional norms on behalf of disfavored groups cannot be over-
stated. Nevertheless, blanket pessimism is unwarranted for 
two reasons.  
To begin with, several cities are already operating under 
consent decrees or settlements that either include an independ-
ent monitor or envisage much judicially supervised reorganiza-
tion of street policing.329 Further, there is no reason to think 
that municipal officials involved in the negotiation and opera-
tionalizing of these deals lack any interest at all in mitigating 
the fierce public pressure to diminish the racial tensions of ur-
ban policing. The application of disparate-impact liability pro-
vides a more cogent way for them to understand how to do so 
than available alternatives.  
In addition, precise agency regulations, such as those is-
sued in 2015 under the FHA, have the potential “to stabilize 
disparate-impact law and to provide clarity to regulated enti-
ties subject to different judicial standards.”330 There is no rea-
son such stabilization cannot be achieved in the policing con-
text through more specific Justice Department regulations 
 
 326. Selmi, supra note 57, at 705. For similar diagnoses, see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (“Disparate impact doctrine has been in a massive 
decline over the past few decades.”); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 
1204–07 (2000) (similarly bemoaning “the decline of disparate impact”). 
 327. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396 
(2007). 
 328. Selmi, supra note 57, at 708 (“Taking seriously the disparate impact 
theory would have posed a substantial challenge to existing practices, which is 
precisely why the theory never has been taken particularly seriously by 
courts.”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 326 (making a similar point by noting 
that courts dislike any departure from a “fault-based” theory of discrimination 
liability). 
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 17–26. 
 330. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 127 (2014). 
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(however unlikely these might be in the near term). Indeed, the 
more granular account of how to think about disparate impact 
in the context of policing data that follows in Part III.C itself 
can do double duty by providing a framework for such regula-
tions. 
Finally, it might be argued that broad support for aggres-
sive street policing within minority communities provides a suf-
ficient justification for racially disparate allocation of Terry 
stops.331 If the very communities that suffer the costs of inten-
sive policing also clamor for such policing, the moral case for 
disparate-impact liability seems thin indeed. Yet evidence for 
community demand in the context of SQF is thin on the ground. 
Protests in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia about stop 
and frisk have been led by organizations from minority com-
munities.332 More generally, to the extent that African-
American political leaders have sought increased policing, 
there have been “accompanying demands to redirect power and 
economic resources to low-income minority communities.”333 But 
“[w]hen blacks ask for better policing, legislators tend to hear 
more instead.”334 Disparate-impact liability is more sensitive to 
the marginal crime-control benefits attached to SQF, as well as 
its costs. It is therefore a sensible way to reconcile minority 
communities’ demands for both better public security and also 
freedom for excessive street policing cannot. 
D. DISPARATE IMPACT IN ACTION 
This final Section sketches how a disparate-impact analy-
sis of SQF data might be put into action. Its twofold aim is to 
show that such inquiries are feasible, and to start to make pro-
 
 331. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated 
Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
197, 197–98 (celebrating African-American communities’ demand for more po-
licing). 
 332. Leland & Moynihan, supra note 14 (noting African-American leader-
ship in protests in New York); Leonor Vivanco, 5 Young Chicago Activists An-
swer 5 Questions About the Movement, REDEYE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www 
.redeyechicago.com/news/redeye-five-activists-answer-five-questions-20160122 
-story.html (profiling leaders of anti-SQF movement in Chicago). 
 333. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Did Blacks Back the Crime Bill?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2016, at A25. 
 334. Id.; see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE 
WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134–38, 
322–23 (2016) (tracing the “war on black crime” back to the Nixon and Reagan 
administrations’ policies). 
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gress on some of the knotty theoretical puzzles raised by dis-
parate impact’s implementation. 
To set the stage for this inquiry, it is useful to consider its 
practical context. The settlements in Philadelphia and Chicago, 
which were both reached without information-generating liti-
gation, require ongoing collection of extensive data concerning 
the timing, justifications, suspect demographics, and conse-
quences of stops.335 How might this data be interrogated for ev-
idence of disparate impact? How concretely can one inquiry into 
whether a discrete practice or policy causes a racially disparate 
impact that is not justified on legitimate and necessary grounds 
be executed?  
In answering these questions, I focus on the theoretical 
questions of what kinds of disparities should count, not more 
technical questions of econometric identification strategy. 
A disparate racial impact can result from one of three ele-
ments of policing strategy. Each of the latter warrants separate 
and distinct analysis. At each level, racial disparities salient to 
the distinctive moral wrong of SQF can emerge. And at each 
level, the state can also avail itself of different legitimate justi-
fications for the disparity. If anything, the feasible analytic 
tools favor the state as a result. Disparate-impact analysis, in 
the fashion developed here, is decisively under-inclusive insofar 
as it does not capture all the ecological and dynamic externali-
ties from SQF. The availability of plural tests to capture a ra-
cially disparate effect only partially compensate for this lacuna. 
Nevertheless, it is the best extant doctrinal framework for the 
problem, and also likely superior to anything that can be creat-
ed from scratch in current political conditions. 
For the purpose of illustration here, I hypothesize a munic-
ipal jurisdiction that has just entered a consent decree. We can 
assume that like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, this 
municipality is racially and economically segregated, with race 
and socioeconomic status closely covarying. We can also assume 
that the city is divided into precincts, which are the founda-
tional elements of the geographic allocation of police. The mu-
nicipality’s SQF, as in real-life cases, is directed at neighbor-
hoods of concentrated poverty and high crime—which are also 
predominantly minority. The municipality is required to gather 
data about stops of the kind elicited by the Chicago and Phila-
 
 335. Philadelphia Settlement, supra note 19, ¶ II.B; Chicago Settlement, 
supra note 18, ¶ I.1. 
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delphia settlements. I will assume police collect that data faith-
fully.336 I focus here on the legal question of what questions can 
be asked of the resulting data. 
I discuss each three levels of analysis in turn. For each lev-
el, I identify the relevant element of state policy or practice; the 
outcome across which racial disparities may be observed; and 
the range of feasible justifications a municipality might offer. 
Where possible, I also note if the question has been examined 
in an existing study or litigation. 
1. Between-Precinct Disparities 
The first level of analysis that should be tested is the rate 
of SQF deployment by precinct. Recall that the core justifica-
tion for SQF tendered by its defenders is that street police are 
deployed where crime occurs; racial disparities arise only be-
cause crime is concentrated in minority neighborhoods.337  
But this may not be the case. Perceptions of crime can also 
be a function of the racial composition of a neighborhood.338 A 
threshold policy decision to be tested is the volume of Terry 
stop per precinct with a lagged measure of crime as a control. 
This is a way of determining whether the geographical distri-
bution of policing resources turns on racial demographics or 
crime rates.339 
For example, Jeffrey Fagan tested whether the number of 
stops per precinct in New York City was disproportionate to the 
racial composition of the precinct, after controlling for several 
different types of historical crime rate.340 His analysis suggested 
that crime-based justification for SQF’s allocation was un-
founded.341 Using an ordinary least squares regression, he 
 
 336. This is a rather ambitious assumption. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social 
Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. & POL. 103, 112 (2002) (expressing 
concerns on this front). 
 337. See sources cited supra note 83. 
 338. See sources cited supra notes 194–95. 
 339. Cf. Sarath Sanga, Does Officer Race Matter?, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
403, 405 (2014) (finding in a study of Oakland street policing that “where one 
is stopped may be more important than by whom one is stopped” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 340. Fagan Report, supra note 51. 
 341. Id. at 33 tbl. 5. The main regression Fagan presents contains a control 
for patrol strength, while one of the sensitivity tests omits that variable. To 
the extent that this analysis seeks to ascertain whether deployments at the 
precinct level are justified, the inclusion of patrol strength creates a potential 
included variable problem. Stated otherwise, patrol strength is a function of 
deployment levels, not a justification of the latter. 
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found that the percentage of African-American residents was a 
stronger predictor of Terry stop volume than lagged rates of 
violent crime, narcotics offices, weapons offenses and tres-
pass.342 Only property and quality-of-life rates outperformed 
race as predictors of stop volume.343 This is an especially strik-
ing result given SQF’s justification in the wake of the Kansas 
City Experiment as a means of reducing violent crime, and as 
an alternative to broken windows policing.344 
It is also striking because the assumption that an increase 
in crime rates should predict a subsequent increase in street 
stops is dubious insofar as it stacks the deck in the state’s favor 
in a normative troubling way. The use of lagged crime rates as 
a control assumes that the only available, or perhaps the best 
available, policing response to upticks in crime concern is more 
intensive street policing.  
But this is false.345 As I have argued, the evidence that SQF 
has a large crime-control effect is weak, especially in compari-
son to alternative policing instruments.346 The use of crime 
rates as a baseline further assumes that Terry stops are re-
sponsive to all species of violent crime. But at least for the pro-
portion of violent crimes that occur within the home against 
partners or other intimates, it is hard to see how Terry stops 
are responsive.347 In short, there is no good reason to assume 
the best, only, or most effective response to rising crime rates in 
a specific neighborhood is to increase the number of people be-
ing stopped.348 
A between-precinct measure of racial disparities can be 
combined with a range of other measures to develop a more nu-
anced rendering of how policing resources are allocated across 
geographic areas. Hence, simple descriptive statistics can pro-
vide useful confirmatory evidence, even if they cannot on their 
 
 342. Id. at 41, 31 n.52, 43. Fagan also presents a series of charts showing 
stop rates per crime complaints by minority population share. Id. at 25–27. 
These illustrate the same disparity. 
 343. Id. at 45. 
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 74 (describing, respectively, 
the Kansas City Experiment and Broken Windows policing). 
 345. See supra text accompanying notes 126–34. 
 346. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 347. Other studies have found that citizen complaints of drug transactions 
do not predict narcotics-related deployment rates. Katherine Beckett et al., 
Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Ar-
rests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 126–27 (2006). 
 348. For a further set of criticisms, see Fagan, supra note 336, at 117–18. 
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own prove disparate-impact liability consistent with Inclusive 
Communities.349 The data might be further interrogated by 
comparing the determinants of precinct-level deployments with 
the rate of stops per resident, conditional on racial identity.350 
Where such citywide tests find that not only do minority neigh-
borhoods bear a disproportionate toll of stops, but minority in-
dividuals also bear a larger share of those stops, there is reason 
for concern that SQF is not only regressive in effect, but also 
triggers the dynamic, vicious-circle processes described in Part 
I.C.  
In addition, the between-precinct distribution of street po-
licing is usefully contrasted with the distribution of other polic-
ing resources. If precincts that receive intensive Terry treat-
ments, for example, are associated with lower rates of other 
policing measures—e.g., they have fewer officers deployed 
across both reactive and proactive policing, or they have persis-
tently longer wait times for 911 calls—then there is further 
reason for skepticism that crime control simpliciter in fact ex-
plains or justifies racial disparities in stops across geographic 
subunits within the municipality. 
2. Within-Precinct Disparities 
The next level of analysis focuses on the distribution of 
Terry stops by racial or ethnic group within a precinct. Be-
tween-precinct tests are incomplete because even if there are 
no between-precinct disparities, a disparate racial impact 
might emerge within a given precinct if racial minorities en-
gaged in the same (potentially criminal) conduct as non-
minorities are more likely, holding all else constant, to be 
stopped or otherwise policed than non-minorities in the same 
position. 
The intuition that racial minorities may be overpoliced in 
comparison to similar non-minority citizens is easy to see in the 
context of racially heterogeneous, central business districts, 
where minority citizens may be perceived as categorically out of 
 
 349. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (noting that constitutional problems would arise 
if “liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity”). 
 350. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE 
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–10 (2008), https:// 
www.aclusocal.org/en/study-racially-disparate-outcomes-los-angeles-police 
-department. 
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place and hence suspicious. But the same disparity can arise 
even in poorer, majority-minority neighborhoods.  
A pair of studies of narcotics policing in Seattle by Kathe-
rine Beckett and her colleagues nicely illustrate how race 
might figure in within-precinct dynamics in this way. Their 
first study demonstrated (among other things) that in the Capi-
tol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, three percent of those purchas-
ing narcotics were African American, while 20.5% of those ar-
rested were African American.351  
Their second study found that predominantly white out-
door drug markets received “far less attention” from police than 
racially diverse ones, such that the “geographic concentration of 
law enforcement resources [was] a significant cause of racial 
disparity.”352 Indeed, a qualitative component of the study 
found that police officers flagged one racially diverse crack 
market while failing to mention a similar but “overwhelmingly 
white” market for prescription drugs operating alongside it.353 
Of special note here, Beckett and her collaborators explicit-
ly consider the possibility that differences in the policing of 
crack cocaine and prescription drug markets may have been 
due to different levels of associated violence.354 They find, how-
ever, that the association between crack and violence “does not 
appear to have existed in Seattle during the period under in-
vestigation.”355  
These studies’ findings echo sociological findings of how ra-
cial composition often predicts perceptions of crime, and histor-
ical findings about the deep roots of stereotypes of black crimi-
nality. They demonstrate the importance of a nuanced and 
contextualized analysis of what is happening within heavily po-
liced neighborhoods, rather than a blasé assumption that heavy 
policing in high-crime neighborhoods is necessarily even-
handed or efficacious. 
A within-precinct analysis usefully considers whether the 
rate of minority stops is better predicted by legitimate policing 
grounds or suspects’ race, conditional on certain precinct level 
characteristics. Within a pool of stop-related data, the number 
of stops per ethnic group within a given time period would be 
 
 351. Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the 
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435 (2005). 
 352. Beckett et al., supra note 347, at 129. 
 353. Id. at 130. 
 354. Beckett et al., supra note 351, at 433. 
 355. Id. 
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the outcome (i.e., dependent) variable to be explained.356 For a 
given precinct, one could ask whether there is a statistically 
significant correlation between the rate of stops and the fact 
individual suspects are African American or Hispanic rather 
than white, after controlling for relevant precinct-level charac-
teristics. Some existing studies deploy a method called multi-
level modeling to control simultaneously for individual and pre-
cinct-level factors.357 I will assume that approach is valid, 
although nothing rests on that assumption so long as some 
parallel econometric technique is available. 
The pivotal question for such multilevel models is the 
choice of control variables to capture “[non-]arbitrary” and 
“[]necessary” justifications.358 A disparate-impact model should 
include only control variables that provide normatively valid 
justifications for a within-precinct racial disparity.  
In this regard, it is fundamentally dissimilar from tests for 
discriminatory motives. A regression-based test for the latter 
operates by excluding all possible explanations for a stop except 
for the race of a suspect. The study employed in the New York 
litigation, for example, controls for the foreign-born proportion 
of a precinct, socioeconomic status, and the presence of a busi-
ness district.359 But a racial disparate impact, as a matter of 
law, arises not only when there is no other possible explanation 
for a racial gap in stop rates. It additionally arises when there 
is no legitimate explanation related to policing goals for that 
gap.  
In this regard, the economic analysis of disparate impacts 
is unlike the large array of econometric studies that focus on a 
“causal if-then question” and treat randomized trials as an 
“ideal.”360 Variables such as the socioeconomic character of a 
 
 356. See, e.g., Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 40–42, 42 tbl. 7 (reporting 
the results of a multilevel Poisson regression on stops by suspected crime con-
trolling for precinct characteristics and lagged crime conditions). 
 357. Multilevel modeling describes a school of approaches for including 
both micro- and macro-level factors in the same equation to explain a single 
dependent variable. Thomas A. DiPrete & Jerry D. Forristal, Multilevel Mod-
els: Methods and Substance, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 332–33 (1994). 
 358. See supra text accompanying notes 323–24. 
 359. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 42, tbl. 7; see also AYRES & 
BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 37–38, tbl. 7. 
 360. JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 11–12 (2009). For this reason, 
the propensity score matching models used in some policing studies are not 
suitable for disparate-impact analysis. See Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 
97–100 (noting and criticizing the use of such models elsewhere). 
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precinct, its foreign-born populace, and officer race have no 
place in disparate-impact analysis.361 Their inclusion leads to 
“included variable bias” insofar as they “would not plausibly 
justify a racial disparity in outcomes.”362 Even when included in 
disparate treatment analyses, they result in “bloated statistical 
models so chock-full of covariates (i.e., control variables) that 
any evidence of disparate treatment disappears.”363 
In several existing studies, lagged crime or violent crime 
rates are used as the baseline control in this sort of multilevel 
model.364 This parameter at least relates directly to the notional 
justification that a municipality has for increased street stops—
i.e., crime-related patterns—subject to the concerns raised 
above.365 It captures the ways in which deployment levels might 
fluctuate in response to shifts in the geographic distribution of 
crime.  
It is also likely to be superior to a benchmark of lagged ar-
rest rates, which is employed in some models.366 The latter are 
potentially influenced by officers’ racial beliefs. To this end, a 
recent metastudy of the effect of suspect race on arrest deci-
sions found that minorities are at least thirty percent more 
likely to be arrested as similar non-minority suspects.367 Histor-
ical arrest rates thus provide a distorted baseline, which ob-
scures potential racial disparities in stops by implicitly control-
ling for officer bias. 
It is worth underscoring once more that the racial composi-
tion of the pool of those suspected of a crime, or arrested for a 
crime is by no means an unproblematic benchmark for the ra-
cial composition of those subject to a Terry stop even within a 
particular neighborhood. The best argument from using such 
 
 361. The racial composition of a precinct is a relevant control if it proxies 
for the expected composition of persons on the street—an assumption that will 
not hold in downtowns or transit hubs. 
 362. AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 13; see also Ian Ayres, Testing 
for Discrimination and the Problem of “Included Variable Bias” 3–4 (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/ 
Testing%20for%20Discrimination.pdf. 
 363. OAKLAND REPORT, supra note 26, at 6. 
 364. See Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 42; AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra 
note 350, at 34. A possible variant on these reports’ approaches is lagged rates 
of gun crime, which bear on the violent crime-related justification at times of-
fered for SQF. 
 365. See supra text accompanying notes 345–47. 
 366. See Gelman et al., supra note 51. 
 367. Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Ar-
rest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011). 
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data as a benchmark, in my view, focuses solely on racial com-
position of the local violent offender population. It hypothesizes 
that police focus either on people or places associated with 
higher violent crime risk. Given racial segregation and racial 
divides between social groups, it is then predicted that the ra-
cial composition of the stopped population will track that of the 
at-risk population. 
Setting aside questions about the efficacy of SQF generally 
as a crime-control measure, there are nonetheless three rea-
sons for skepticism of even this benchmark. First, this logic as-
sumes that municipalities can accurately zero in on not just 
places but persons who present a risk of violence. It is not clear 
that this is so. For example, a recent study of Chicago’s “Stra-
tegic Subjects” List, which was used in this fashion, found that 
individuals on the city’s list were no more or less likely to be 
victimized by violence than a control group.368 
Second, if SQF focuses on places rather than persons, the 
number of individuals involved in violent crime is still a small 
fraction of the volume of people stopped.369 In the exceptionally 
bloody month of August 2016 in Chicago, for example, ninety 
people were killed by gunfire.370 The number of stops that 
month was likely at least two orders of magnitude greater. 
Even assuming that the Chicago police in that month were fo-
cused accurately on corners where violence was likely to occur, 
more than one hundred instances of reasonable articulable 
suspicion were being targeted for every one act of violence. And 
even if police then have reason to anticipate a particular corner 
or street will witness violence, at a minimum some ninety-nine 
out of every one hundred stops will have no relation to that vio-
lence. Historical patterns of violence cannot explain why rea-
sonable articulable suspicion existed for those individuals. The 
racial demographics of violent crimes or violent crime-related 
 
 368. Jessica Saunders et al., Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi-
Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 347 (2016). 
 369. For evidence of the very small number of those involved in gun vio-
lence, see Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic, but Not Random: The Social 
Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 139 (2015) 
(finding nonfatal gun injuries were confined to “less than 6 percent” of Chica-
go’s population). 
 370. Jeremy Gorner, After 90 Killed in August, Chicago May Soon Pass 
Last Year’s Homicide Toll, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-homicides-august 
-20160901-story.html. 
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arrests on a given street or corner do not necessarily predict the 
racial distribution of reasonable articulable suspicion that po-
lice can witness at any given moment in time. For most stops, 
most of the time, therefore, it seems likely that historical crime 
rates will be orthogonal to the incidence of a Terry stop. 
Finally, imagine a municipality that affirmatively directs 
its police to engage in a pattern of stops that mimics the racial 
distribution of violent crime offenders. In many contexts, that 
distribution will skew heavily towards African Americans (and 
to a lesser extent Hispanics). This is, in effect a system of racial 
quotas where some large fraction of those subject to state coer-
cion suffer that fate based solely on their race rather than their 
own past conduct. Especially given the weak empirical support 
for SQF’s efficacy, such a policy raises stark Equal Protection 
concerns even under the Supreme Court’s current highly re-
strictive view of the doctrine.371 
Instead of using crime rates, violent crime rates, or analo-
gous arrest rates as a benchmark of just policing, therefore, a 
study of disparate impact would ideally track Beckett and col-
leagues’ Seattle study in estimating the racial composition of 
the baseline population subject to police action through ethno-
graphic observation (of open-air drug markets) and other 
means.372 Ideally, that is, data would be sampled, perhaps from 
police body-cameras, to estimate the racial composition of the 
population observed on patrol for whom reasonable articulable 
suspicion obtained.  
If, like police in Beckett’s studies, officers tended to ignore 
non-minority offenders while stopping minority offenders, a 
within-precinct disparity would be established with certainty. 
Such an approach is hardly impossible. Indeed, a recent study 
of Oakland policing used text analysis of sound recordings from 
officers’ body-cameras to identify differential racial treatment 
of citizens during street encounters.373 
3. Within- and Between-Officer Disparities 
Finally, racial disparities can emerge not only at the ag-
gregate levels of between- and within-precincts.374 They can also 
 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 268–72. 
 372. Beckett et al., supra note 351, at 422–23; Beckett et al., supra note 
347, at 116–18. 
 373. OAKLAND REPORT, supra note 26, at 15–19. 
 374. See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (describing between-officer disparities). 
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arise either because some (or all) officers within a precinct dif-
ferentiate between minority and non-minority suspects without 
a legitimate justification. This level of police action—which 
comprises the dispersed exercise of individual officers’ discre-
tion—demands attention to the specific sequence of distinct po-
lice actions embedded within a particular interaction, ranging 
from the decision to stop, the decision to frisk, the use of force, 
and the imposition of subsequent consequences such as cita-
tions or arrests. Given the existence of outstanding warrants as 
a reason for arrests, however, the latter are a particularly 
tricky variable to analyze because they may be unrelated to the 
initial stop.  
I sketch here the most promising approaches for identify-
ing racial disparities at the individual officer level. I then cau-
tion against the use of the most popular economic model of po-
lice stops, commonly known as the KPT model, as neither 
apposite nor realistic as a framework for analyzing SQF. 
Individual officers might create racially disparate effects in 
two distinct ways. First, the Terry standard of reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion is a vague term with a range of possible cal-
ibrations.375 Some or all officers might apply stronger or weaker 
evidentiary predicates for stops of different racial groups. Se-
cond, as Fryer’s powerful analysis of New York policing demon-
strates, officers might differentially treat minorities who have 
been stopped by employing a greater quantum of violence. Oth-
er outcomes, such as citations and arrests, might also be dis-
parately allocated. Disparities in both stop rates and post-stop 
outcomes should be analyzed in a disparate-impact analysis. 
On the stop-rate question, a simple measure is to rerun the 
multilevel models used for within-precinct disparities using of-
ficers rather than precincts as the relevant unit of analysis and 
lagged crime rates (measured at the smallest available geo-
graphic unit) as a control.376 A parallel analysis can be run for 
outcomes, such as the seizure of contraband or firearms.377 
Again, included variable bias would result if controls other 
than legitimate policing justification (such as the lagged-crime-
rate measure) were included. 
 
 375. See supra text accompanying notes 221–24. 
 376. This has been done in a number of earlier studies. AYRES & 
BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 22; Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 65–69. 
 377. Id. at 69–71. 
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Alternatively, a more promising approach involves the use 
of the “stop-level hit rate” (SHR) or the ex-ante probability of 
discovering contraband or a weapon based on what an officer 
knows before a stop.378 Focusing on weapons-related stops, 
Sharad Goel and his colleagues first use two years’ worth of 
historical stop forms to calculate the actual probability of find-
ing a weapon for various combinations of factors listed on stop 
forms as the basis of “reasonable articulable suspicion” (along 
with location, timing, and local hit-rate data).379 This enables 
them to calculate the distribution of ex-ante probabilities of 
finding weapons for minorities and non-minorities, both in gen-
eral and holding location constant.380 In effect, by comparing the 
distribution of SHRs for blacks and whites, they show that the 
effective quantum of reasonable articulable suspicion for minor-
ities is lower than that for non-minorities.381 The same analysis 
might be executed by precinct or by officer to determine if racial 
disparities are either geographically concentrated or the work 
of a small fraction of officers. 
Rather than following Goel’s lead, the economics literature 
is dominated by a model by John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and 
Petra Todd known as the KPT model.382 In capsule form, KPT is 
a game-theoretical model of traffic stops in which police seek to 
maximize arrests and both black and white motorists maximize 
contraband. Police observe race. Both they and motorists stra-
tegically anticipate the other’s actions. KPT predicts a Nash 
equilibrium in which blacks and whites are stopped at different 
rates, while the probability of finding contraband (i.e., the hit 
rate) across groups is equal.383  
The force of the KPT model is to show how what at first 
seems a racial disparity—unequal stop rates—is in fact ex-
plained by dynamic strategic action by both police and motor-
ists.384 As a correlative, differences in hit rates provide evidence 
of taste-based discrimination. 
 
 378. Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at 6. 
 379. Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?, supra note 52, at 371–73. 
 380. Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at 40–51. 
 381. Id. at 9–10 (“49% of the stops of blacks fell below the 1% probability 
threshold . . . but only 19% of the stops of whites.”). 
 382. Knowles et al., supra note 33, at 205–07; see also Nicola Persico & 
Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rate Test for Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches, 25 
JUST. Q. 37, 39–42 (2008). 
 383. See Persico & Todd, supra note 382 at 42. 
 384. Id. (“[If ] hit rates are equalized [across groups], then disparities in 
search frequencies across groups, while possible, are not the result of police 
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 For a number of reasons, though, the KPT model is not 
well suited to identify the core wrong of racially disparate polic-
ing. To begin with, KPT is “informative only about bias in 
searches, not in stops.”385 It is also a model for detecting taste-
based discrimination, or animus, rather than the use of race as 
an accurate generalization or the disparate racial impact of an-
other factor (e.g., socioeconomic status).386 Stated otherwise, it 
ignores all negative externalities from race-based policing.387 
Even in this more limited compass, its core equilibrium concept 
rests on the questionable assumption that police and motorists’ 
know of, and dynamically adapt to, each other’s behavior.388 Ex-
tensions of their work that vary the models show that equal hit 
rates might also be consistent with racial animus.389  
Because the modeling assumptions of KPT are so contro-
versial, and its implications so fragile in the face of subtle 
changes in relevant actors’ information and motivation, in my 
view it does not provide a useful lens even for the limited ques-
tion of whether there is animus-based searches in the first in-
stance. 
 
bias.”). 
 385. Id. 
 386. Engel, supra note 62, at 3. 
 387. Durlauf, supra note 151, at F407. 
 388. For example, the KPT model assumes that “in the absence of preferen-
tial discrimination, everyone carries contraband,” which is “not true.” Sanga, 
supra note 339, at 407. Moreover, “the quest to empirically decompose motives 
into distinctly moral and economic categories can prove quixotic.” Id. at 409. 
For an extensive critique of this and other assumptions of the KPT model, see 
Robin S. Engel & Rob Tillyer, Searching for Equilibrium: The Tenuous Nature 
of the Outcome Test, 25 JUST. Q. 54, 65–66 (2008). 
Persico and Todd cite the fact that equal hit rates are observed as evi-
dence that their assumptions are correct. Persico & Todd, supra note 382, at 
45. In their original paper, hit rates for Hispanics did not equal rates for 
whites. Knowles et al., supra note 33, at 222; accord Rubén Hernández-
Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in 
Aggregate Data, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 959, 972 (2004) (same result in a Mis-
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CONCLUSION 
Aggressive deployment of Terry stops has been a point of 
friction between urban police and impoverished minority com-
munities for more than fifty years. There has been a moment of 
late in which a measure of reform appeared politically feasi-
ble—or so the recent spate of settlements and consent decrees 
might suggest.390 It may well be that this window is closing due 
to national-level political changes. But the underlying problems 
of discriminatory policing, popular dissatisfaction with exces-
sive and onerous street hassle, and the frequency of police vio-
lence will not go away. Even if the federal government fails to 
act, there are local, state, and private actors with strong incen-
tives to press for reform. Nevertheless, without a clear account 
of why and when aggressive deployment of Terry stops can be a 
moral wrong, we will not have a clear sense of when or how we 
might deploy law to remedy it. 
To this end, this Article has aimed to specify the distinctive 
moral wrong of SQF and to demonstrate that the law does have 
resources to identify it. My central claim has been that a dis-
parate-impact lens, applicable to police pursuant to Title VI 
and state law, provides a better vantage point than black-letter 
constitutional law. By demonstrating that a disparate-impact 
lens is constitutional, potent, and practicable in terms of its 
implementation, I hope to prompt a deeper conversation about 
the positive role that law and courts can play in resolving the 
aching sore that is minority-police relations in America’s cities 
today. 
What I have offered here, though, is emphatically only the 
beginning of that story: the law, I have shown, can be used to 
identify instances in which street policing plays a role in per-
petuating and deepening racial and social stratification. Once 
identified, dysfunctional policing must be remedied through po-
litical pressure and legal injunctions that will vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction.391 There is no universal panacea. Police 
reform, moreover, is only one element of a larger necessary 
program of social reform necessary to dislodge the persistence 
of racialized concentrated poverty. Police do not create ghettos. 
Nor will getting policing right dissolve ghettos overnight. Nev-
 
 390. See supra text accompanying notes 17–26. 
 391. For a useful examination of some possible avenues of institutional re-
form, see WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 63, at 117–45 (enumerating possible 
reform measures). 
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ertheless, doing the hard work of police reform is a necessary 
step in rectifying the historical blight of entrenched racial 
stratification. 
